

**DEATH AND DYING OF THE SELF  
IN  
LOUIS de BERNIÈRES' BIRDS WITHOUT WINGS**

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**Yüksek Lisans Tezi  
İngiliz Dili ve Edebiyatı Anabilim Dalı  
Danışman: Doç. Dr. Tatiana GOLBAN**

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**T.C.**

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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
İNGİLİZ DİLİ VE EDEBİYATI ANABİLİM DALI  
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**Her hakkı saklıdır.**

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

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SOSYAL BİLİMLER ENSTİTÜSÜ  
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Melis KUTLU tarafından hazırlanan *Death and Dying of the Self in Louis de Bernières' Birds Without Wings* konulu YÜKSEK LİSANS Tezinin Sınavı, Namık Kemal Üniversitesi Lisansüstü Eğitim ve Öğretim Yönetmeliği uyarınca 10.06.2019 günü, saat 11.30'da yapılmış olup, tezin.....<sup>kabul edilmesine</sup> OYBİRLİĞİ OYÇOKLUĞU ile karar verilmiştir.

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## ÖZET

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Edebi dönemler boyunca, ölüm, en ilgi çekici temalar arasında yer almıştır. Böylelikle, ölüm, birçok edebi metinde kullanılmıştır. Ölüm temasının işlenişi ve tanımı, o dönemdeki teorilere ve koşullara bağlı olarak değişiklik göstermiştir. Özellikle Postmodern Dönemde, ölüm, öz benliğin ölüm süreciyle birlikte daha farklı bir bakış açısı kazanmıştır. Bu bakış açısı, yazarlarda aşırı ilgi uyandırmış ve hayal güçlerinden yardım almışlardır. Postmodern dönemde, Heidegger ölüm, Dasein ve Otantiklik teorileriyle, yazarlara rehber olmuştur. Özellikle Dasein teorisiyle yazarları aydınlatmıştır. Dasein teorisi, varlığı ve var olmayışı sorgular, öz benliği gün yüzüne çıkarmaya çalışır. Bu zorlu süreçte, ölüm, Dasein'in öz benliğini yansıtan ayna görevini görür. Ölümle yüzleşmek, büyük paniğe, anksiyeteye ve korkuya sebep olur. Ölüm, öz benliğin diğer bir eşiğidir. Dasein' in geçmesi gereken en zorlu süreçtir. Varlık, ölüm ve yaşama sorgulamasıyla, Dasein, yaşam modunu otantik olana döndürür. Bu modda, Dasein, varlığını ve öz benliğini gözlemler. Bu

gözlem ve sorgulama, öz benlik farkındalığına ve keşfine yol açar. Bu keşfin en iyi şekilde tasavvuf eden edebi çalışmalardan biri de Louis de Bernières'in *Kanatsız Kuşlar* adlı eseridir. Bu eserle beraber, karakterlerin tüm hayat yolculukları boyunca karşılaştıkları ölümler ve ölüm süreçleri, edebi bir üslupla anlatılmış ve okurlar da bu yolculuklara eşlik etmiştir.

**Anahtar kelimeler:** Heidegger, Dasein, Otantiklik, Ölüm, Ölüm süreci, Varlık, Var olmayış, Özbenlik keşfi, Özbenlik farkındalığı, Louis de Bernières, Kanatsız Kuşlar.

## ABSTRACT

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Throughout the periods of literature, Death has been one of the most interesting and attractive themes. In that meaning, Death has been used as theme many times in literary works. The ways of describing death has been altered by periods in order to circumstances and contemporary theories. Especially in Postmodern Period, theme of Death has gained another aspect with Dying process of the self. According to this aspect, authors have been curious about the process of dying and imagination has had great contribution. In Postmodern Period, Heidegger has become guide to authors by his theories about Death, Dasein and Authenticity. He has enlightened authors with his theory of Dasein. Theory of Dasein questions the Existence and Inexistence and tries to disclose the self. In this process of struggle, Death owns a mirror role, which reflects Dasein' self. Facing with the self induces great panic, fear and anxiety. It is another threshold of the self. It is the most difficult process that Dasein gets through. With questioning the existence, life and death,

Dasein alters the mode of live to authentic one. In this mode, Dasein begins to observe own existence and the self. This questioning and observation lead to self-awareness and self-exploration. One of the best novels which describe this journey for self-realization and self-exploration is Louis De Bernières' *Birds Without Wings*. With this narrative, readers accompany characters in their life journey. In these journeys, readers and characters witness many various kinds of deaths and dying processes.

**Key words:** Heidegger, Dasein, Authenticity, Self – awareness, Death, Dying Process, Existence, Inexistence, Non-existence, Self – exploration, Louis De Bernières, *Birds Without Wings*



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## ABBREVIATIONS

**W,II:** The World as Will and Representations Vol: II

**W,I:** The World as Will and Representations , Vol: I

**Ibid:** At the same work, at place or literary work

## INTRODUCTION

Throughout the human history, people have questioned specific subjects. This questioning begins with creation and ends with death. Death is the main subject that humankind still not able to understand totally. Every period, every age has different consideration of death. However, death has never lost its significance in human mind. Questioning of death had begun by philosophy as usual and then other disciplines focused on it by one by.

Death is a great concept for philosophers and authors through history. In this concern, death is examined by theories, definitions, and concepts through periods. Theoreticians study death and dying process from different aspects. All these aspects trail in the narrative with different situations and characters.

On the other hand, death is a subject which coexists with historicity. History repeats itself by wars, contemporary circumstances and all of them lead death. Death is the main possibility of live. It is undeniable part of life. On the individual level, history has repetition either. All the humankind has same stages in their lives; all of them have struggles, frustrations, desperations, disappointments.

Searching for the truth behind death commences with its definition. The first definition emerges as: *“Death is generally considered as the separation of the soul and body; in which sense it stands opposed to life, which consists in the union thereof”*<sup>1</sup>.

On the other hand, it asserts the idea that death has three primary usages; one is Death as an event, second one is Death as a condition and the last one is Death as a state of existence or nonexistence. The first usage of death as an event considers *“Death is an event that cuts off a life”*<sup>2</sup>Death occurs and then the life ends.

The other usage which is Death as a condition, considered as *“Death is the nonreversible condition in which an organism is incapable of carrying out the vital*

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<sup>1</sup> *Encyclopaedia of Britannica* (Vol. 2, p. 309). (n.d.).

<sup>2</sup> Kastenbaum, R. (2003). *MacMillan Encyclopaedia of Death and Dying*. New York: MacMillan Reference USA. p.224

*functions of life.*”<sup>3</sup> This consideration is able to show some disagreements with experts. Anyway, it has the major acceptance. The last one is the most significant one, especially, in postmodern area, is Death as a state of existence or nonexistence; “*Death is what becomes of a person after death. It refers not to the event that ended life or the condition of the body at that time, but rather to whatever form of existence might be thought to prevail when a temporal life has come to its end.*”<sup>4</sup>

In the other disciplines, for instance medicine, the definition of death has great amount of alteration through passage of time. Every year with help of technology, treatments have changed so it leads to alteration of definition. Before its alteration, it was “*Death was the cessation of life as indicated by the absence of blood circulation, respiration, pulse, and other vital functions.*”<sup>5</sup> Fortunately, medical experts accept this definition after new biotechnological development, the redefinition of death is brain death. Death is only able to be accepted after brain death.

Death has various definitions and redefinitions after technological developments and periods as it is seen. Though, it has great consideration upon philosophy through history. It commences from Ancient Ages to present times. Among all, the first to discuss one of the earliest statements are made by Epicurus. His ideas create great impact upon postmodern philosophers as Heidegger, Baudrillard, Derrida, and Nietzsche.

Each of their arguments have different approaches as being under influence of periods that they lived in. The circumstances, expectations of society, crisis of the self, of the world and words, chaos in their periods and their minds affect their approaches and create anxieties of death and dying process. Some of philosophers discuss death’s itself and its anxiety, some of others have great doubts about dying process and the rest have theories on after death and transition to nonexistence.

First chapter of this study, various theories on death are researched. First of all, in early periods, Epicurus represents the period’s circumstances, way of thinking

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<sup>3</sup> Kastenbaum, R. (2003). *MacMillan Encyclopaedia of Death and Dying*. New York: MacMillan Reference USA. p.224

<sup>4</sup> Ibid: 225

<sup>5</sup> Ibid: 226

in that period. He questions fear of death. He discloses his theory by hedonism, he is considered as father of hedonism. He intensifies twofold fears, one is fear of god, and the other is fear of death. According to him, fear of death is based on religious beliefs. After he propagates his theory, he faces with many opponents. He responds these opponents hedonistically. His hedonistic basis does not approve all kinds of desires; he only supports natural and rational ones. Then, epicureans come with another concern which is dying process. They questions the ways of dying such as light, mild, severe. According to epicureans these different processes of dying give clues about the dying one's previous life. All of them gather on the same point for Epicureans that death is not a thing to be afraid of.

The next theoretician is Hegel. He concerns about theory of self-consciousness during dying process and death. He owns various theories about consciousness and mind such as collective like-mindedness as Geist, knowledge of the self, historical form of life and phenomenology.

Schopenhauer is another theoretician, with his theory of death and dying. He gather all knowledge together and accepts them as a whole as knowledge of death, philosophy life and contemplative life. He asserts death is an awakening and self-realization.

Nietzsche is very different than previous theoreticians. His theory of Nihilism creates influence upon his thoughts about death. He mostly focuses on the way of living as like a superman with great power of will and the self.

Heidegger is the main theoretician of this study. His theory of Dasein influences on many of authors and theoreticians. One of them is De Bernières. De Bernières practises his theory of Dasein on the structure of his novel. Some of characters represent Dasein. His theories of existence, inexistence and nonexistence frame his ideas about death. He also discusses the death of others, being close to death. He is against the fear of death but he supports the anxiety of death as a benefit for Dasein. His Dasein transmits from everydayness to authentic mode. Dasein's most specific characteristic is his questioning.

Foucault is one of representative theoreticians in postmodern era. His theories on death are very controversial in his period. He advocates death of man. Still, this theory is not easy to comprehend. His other theories are discussed as like human freedom, finitude, and ambiguity of man.

The other postmodern representative is Baudrillard. His theoretical focus is simulacra. His concern about this theory emerges from “reality does not exist anymore”, only simulations survive and people of postmodern period suffer from not able to reach reality. He categorizes four stages of simulacra as a process. It does not suddenly emerge.

This study's last theoretician is Derrida. His theory of deconstruction and binary oppositions are very remarkable in postmodern era. Both of them influence many of theoreticians and authors. Also De Bernières practises these two theories in his novel. He creates a world of harmony by binary oppositions. His other theory, historicity, also creates great influence on the novel. The characters in the novel express their thoughts under the influence of historicity.

The second chapter describes general characterization of the novel. This chapter presents general description of the characters in the novel; their connections with each other, their sufferings, circumstances. At the beginning of this chapter, general characteristics of the novel are disclosed as the structure of novel, chronotope of the novel. Then, general characteristics of the town, Eskibahçe is depicted by its people, its people's relations between each other, characteristics of the people.

In the first subchapter, apocalyptic characteristics, the novel represents many of apocalyptic, devilish and angelic items. All the items refer to the end of world. In the end of life, every characters in the novel attempt to reach the answer.

The second subchapter is based on the beauty. The representation of beauty in the novel is very innovative. Especially, this beauty concept is processed by characters' voices. Characters' thoughts about beauty are distinctive. This diversity enriches the novel's theme.



The last subchapter researches the harmony of oppositions. Binary oppositions glitter throughout the novel and show themselves in all over the novel such as characters (for instance, Drosula and Philothei), circumstances (Eskibahçe in harmony, rest of the world in chaos), incidences (İbrahim The Mad reaches real love with Philothei, on the contrary, Rüstem Bey never reaches), and towns (Istanbul vs. Eskibahçe).

The third chapter studies Dasein theory via Karatavuk as a representative. Karatavuk is a great representative of Dasein. His process of growing, suffering in the war and returning to the home reflect Dasein's cycle of becoming. His questioning of life, war, religion, and death transmits him from everydayness to authentic mode.

In the first subchapter, comparison of Karatavuk and other male characters discloses the difference of Karatavuk as Dasein as his way of thinking, his behaviours against to the harsh circumstances, terrible incidences and his endurance help him to survive and become a Dasein.

The second subchapter and third subchapter conceive witnessing death of others. Other characters reflect their sufferings, agony and fear of death, loss. Anyway, Karatavuk express none of them. His attitude towards dead bodies and relatives' death is very astonishing and shocking. He performs all the characteristics of Dasein, especially fragmentariness.

The last chapter analyses death of the self with Georgio P. Theodorou's narration of his dying process and last moment of his life. This chapter in the novel is also very shocking and absurd experience for the readers.

This chapter has four subchapters. In the first subchapter, dying process discloses the incidence with help of different theories like Derrida's becoming conscious, Yalom's anxiety of death and Heidegger's being close to death. The second subchapter depicts the representation of the self with again help of Derrida's historicity, Baudrillard's simulacra, Heidegger's Dasein. The third subchapter analyses Dasein's approach to history. The character G.P. Theorodou

expresses his thoughts about history, criticizes historical figures and history's cyclical nature.

The last subchapter focuses on the last moment of Dasein. The last subchapter reflects how Dasein accomplishes death. The final scene gives a striking experience to the readers and this scene also shelters many theories that Yalom considers physicality of death, mortality of soul, awakening experience, ultimate and nothingness.

## **CHAPTER 1**

### **1.THEORIES ON DEATH AND DYING PROCESS THROUGHOUT THE HISTORY**

Throughout the history, death is a tremendous inspiration and concept of questioning for philosopher. That is the main reason, why every period, at least one of philosophers deal with death and expresses their ideas, theories, concepts. Death and dying process concepts are ageless. Because no one still grasp the real meaning or reality about them. They are the most significant secrecy of the human history. People still analyse these concepts and still they preserve their secrecy. And beneath this paragraph, some of the philosophers who are representative of their periods and their theories are discussed.

#### **1.1. Epicurus' Theories on Death**

In the Ancient Period, people experience excessive anxiety about death itself. People were scared of even its idea. Contemporary philosopher of that age was Epicurus. Epicurus has great impact upon postmodern philosophers. He is ancestor of postmodern philosophers who consider the concept of death. He is a prototype. In that respect, he is known by his theory on death. Even though in his period, people regarded death as scary, unknown process.

Epicurus who lived between 341 and 271 B.C.E was famous with his argument "Should we fear death?", an argument that creates influence upon his age. He considered on the idea whether death is fearful or not. Epicurus was beyond his

century, in that he owned a school in “Garden” area. He accepted women and even slaves that were not adequate for the ruler class in his period. Due to that, he was mocked by aristocratic critics. Although he was mocked and criticized by aristocratic critics, he became one of most influential philosophers.

His philosophy and theory are based on hedonism. He is considered to be father of hedonism. He asserted the idea that people should take necessary and natural desires and the others are just vain. The vain desires could be exemplified as luxury or indulgence etc. He focuses on happiness in earth. He advocates the idea that unhappiness equals with disturbance of mind that leads to irrational beliefs, fears and desires. He does not accept all the kind of desires that he explains in Letter to Meneoceus “*We do not mean the pleasures of profligates and those that consist in sensuality . . . but freedom from pain in the body and trouble in the mind.*” He expresses main pleasure as pleasure of mind which is tranquillity (ataraxia); “*banishing mere opinions to which are due the greatest disturbance of spirit*” (Bailey 1926, p. 127).

Epicurus stresses two kinds of fears one is gods the other one is death. He assumes them as vain and irrational. He clarifies this idea in his Principal Doctrines “*without natural science it is not possible to attain our pleasures unalloyed*” (Bailey 1926, p. 97). He strengthens his theory with Democritus’ atomism, which concerns “*the universe and everything in it is the product of accidental forces and composed of small bits of matter called atoms (atomoi).*”<sup>6</sup> By this means Epicurus acknowledges Democritus’ logical theory and implements this theory to these two fears, especially death. Through the experience of death, this process is to be accepted as scientific phase that atoms in the body are dispersed and the subject easily ceased. In that duration he defends his theory:

(...) death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality. For there is nothing terrible in life for the man who has

---

<sup>6</sup> Warren, J. (2006). *Facing Death: Epicurus and his critics*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

truly comprehended that there is nothing terrible in not living. [Death] does not then concern either the living or the dead, since for the former it is not, and the latter are no more.”

(Bailey 1926, pp. 124–125).

Epicurus claims that fear of death has emerged from religious beliefs. Fear of gods leads to fear of death. Unknown afterlife has scared people in those periods. Epicurus gives his statements, by fourfold remedy *tetrapharmakos*:<sup>7</sup>

God should not concern to us.

Death is not to be feared.

What is good is easy to obtain.

What is bad is easily avoided.<sup>8</sup>

By these four statements, Epicurean thoughts approve the idea that extracts fear of death from people’s life and reach their life goals without any hesitation. Nonetheless, fear of death does not scare epicureans after this sentiments but fear of pain scares them. With the argument of Diogenes who submits the idea fear of pain:

But as it is, this fear is sometimes manifest and sometimes not. It is manifest when we clearly avoid some evil, for example fire, fearing that we might meet our deaths as a result of it. It is not manifest when while we are thinking of some other thing fear has crept into our nature and lurks (...) (Diogenes of Oinoanda fr. 35 II Smith).

By this passage, Diogenes refers to Epicureans as “We”. Diogenes aims to establish a link between fear of death and fear of pain. Thus, Epicureans are hedonistic; fear of pain is acceptable for them. After this statement, Epicureans search for extract fear of pain that is natural. In the above passage, Diogenes prompted the idea that is not always easy to identify the fear of things like pain. In the end of this fragment, Epicureans acknowledge that the fear of pain not death.

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<sup>7</sup> For a version of the *tetrapharmakos* see Philodemus *Adv. Soph.* (*PHerc.* 1005) 5.9–13 Angeli.

<sup>8</sup> Warren, J. (2006) *Ibid.* p.7

After his theory of death, many critics and scholars contradict this theory. For instance Warren Shibles expressed his opposition claiming that “*We cannot fear the state of death because we will not be conscious after death. But we certainly can fear losing consciousness*” (Shibles 1974, p. 38). Epicurus responded to some similar concerns, stating “*That, which gives no trouble when it comes, is but an empty pain in anticipation*” (Bailey 1926, pp. 124–125).

Epicurus develops his theory upon the hedonistic principles. He does not approve easily every kind of desires. He rather acknowledges only the natural and the rational ones. In Antique age, people had been moved by fear; fear of gods, fear of death, and fear of loss. On that concern, Epicurus was latitudinarian as he attempted to encourage people not to be afraid of gods, and death by encouraging the pleasure from the life and by letting the mind to its pleasure, deserting all irrational thoughts.

Epicureans explicitly detect four kinds of fears such as:

1. The fear of being dead.
2. The fear that one will die, that one's life is going to end.
3. The fear of premature death.
4. The fear of the process of dying.<sup>9</sup>

They try to find ways to escape all of these four fears. The first 3 ones are able to easily visible in Epicureans’ antithesis. However, fear of process of dying is the only type that even Epicureans are not able to detract from the life. Epicureans have weaker argument concerning the diminishing of fear in the dying process. They try to strengthen their argument by referring Seneca’s statement about dying process:

[dolor], levis es si ferre possum; brevis es si ferre non possum.

If you are light, pain, I can bear you; if I cannot bear you, you are short.

(Seneca Ep. Mor. 24.14)

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<sup>9</sup> Warren, J. (2006). Ibid:4

By help of Seneca's statement about dying process, Epicureans developed another argument against this theory. If the pain is light, it's tolerable, if it's severe, the life shortens. If the pain is severe, it has an end with death. This argument as it is seen very weak against the opposite theories. Then they again change their theory about fear of dying process, claiming that as long as the pain is tolerable, dying process is not fearful. The counter theories assert the idea that fear of death and fear of dying process is necessary as that comes from nature of humankind. Epicureans strongly reject this idea. Toward the end of his argument, he gives a great conclusion with these statements: *"Death is nothing to us; for what is dispersed does not perceive, and what does not perceive is nothing to us."*<sup>10</sup>

In middle Ages, death and dying process has developed from religious argument. In this age, religion has a great impact upon people and, opposite Epicurean attitude, fear of death and dying process emerges with enormous anxiety. People in this period attempt to relieve their anxiety with help of religion which comes by fear of god and afterlife.

## 1.2. Hegel's Theories on Death

After Middle Age, in the second half of 18<sup>th</sup> century, Hegel comes up with his theory self-consciousness on dying process and death. In Phenomenology of Spirit, he develops phenomenology which he describes it as science of the experience of consciousness at first. He develops some theories and statements like; collective like-mindedness, which he calls it as Geist, linguistics, possibility and viability of historical form of a life, historical experience and their inter-relationship. He improves his theory of phenomenology with Geist; self-knowledge as actuality of the self. He assumes that *"self-consciousness is desire itself"*<sup>11</sup> and then he revises his statement by *"self-consciousness attains its satisfaction only in another self-consciousness."*<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Warren, J.(2006) Ibid: 17

<sup>11</sup> R.B. Pippin, *Hegel on Self-consciousness: Desire and Death in the Phenomenology of Spirit*. Princeton Univ Press,2014, p.2

<sup>12</sup>.Pippin, R.B.(2014).Ibid: 3

In the beginning of his book, he discusses about the consciousness and, in the fourth chapter his argument alters into self-consciousness. The concept of the Self undergoes a long process of transformation, from the Middle Ages religious approach to Descartes' rationalist link between thinking and being. This argument goes through Spinoza's attribution of thought next with Leibniz's individual spirituality. After this period, in Enlightenment, great influence of empiricists' conceptual grasp emerges with Kantian rational will. In Romantic era, Fichte's philosophy of pure self is developed by Schelling as substantial being and subjective thought. After Schelling's philosophy, Hegel develops his philosophy with help of Phenomenology as self-identification, self-externalization and objective nature. In these subjects, especially Heidegger is influenced greatly that self-consciousness through the process of dying. Heidegger discusses these thoughts in his theory of Dasein.

### **1.3. Schopenhauer's Theories on Death**

After Hegel's philosophy of self-consciousness, Schopenhauer in the Romantic era, projects his theories and thesis about death and dying. Schopenhauer is influenced by Socrates' contemplative life approach. Even his last moments, Socrates has his philosophical attitude "*The true votary of philosophy is ...of his own accord ... always engaged in the pursuit of dying and death.*" (Ibid., 64a.) He accepts death as it is and he attempts to claim that the project it is not strange thing. Socrates acknowledges the death as detachment of body and soul, then soul reaches the pure thought: "*Thought is best when the mind is gathered into itself ... when it takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it, when it has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being.*" (Ibid., 65c.)

According to his studies, he assumes that it is impossible to discover true knowledge or virtue by depending on bodily senses. He accepts philosophical Greek concept of soul as *Psyche*. He asserts the idea that, true being does not emerge when it is bound to body, soul must have its own place; "*dwelling in its own place alone, as in another life, so also in this, as far as it can.*" (Ibid., 67c.) After this statement, he also prompts his idea about afterlife, which provides a basis for soul to

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comprehend the true being. Socrates actually refers early desires and senses by using the concept of *body*.<sup>13</sup>

Following Socrates' doctrine, Schopenhauer acknowledges death, philosophy and contemplative life as a whole. He assumes the idea that man would not be able to philosophize without death and accepts it as inspiring and as a muse for philosophy. Schopenhauer's most significant statement about death is will-to-live, with influence of contemplative life. It is an approval of will and it is blind. Being aware of death is terrifying status. Yet, his philosophy with contemplative life refuses extreme will-to-live. Schopenhauer heroic refusal of will-to-live proves his desire to have a contemplative life. In this point, he is opposing many other postmodern philosophers like Heidegger.

According to Schopenhauer's philosophy, death and dying is natural event like in everyday routine. He assumes it as deep sleep: "*death is a sleep in which individuality is forgotten, everything else awakens again or rather has remained awake*". (W, I. 278) Actually he acknowledges that death is kind of awakening, self-realization and warning against egoism:

Egoism really consists in man's restricting all reality to his own person, in that he imagines he lives in this alone, and not in others. Death teaches him something better, since it abolishes this person, so that man's true nature, that is his will, will henceforth live only in other individuals ... for the difference between external and internal ceases. (W, II, 507)

#### 1.4. Nietzsche's Theories on Death

After Romantic Period, in 19<sup>th</sup> century, philosophy of death is altered in another approach than Schopenhauer's philosophy. Regarding of contemporary circumstances, social systems and new discoveries changed people's approach against death and dying process. People begin to think about process of dying against by status of frustration and alienation from the society. These are the main fundamentals of new type of pessimistic philosophy as Nietzsche. Nietzsche's Nihilism changes all the approach against life and death.

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<sup>13</sup> R. R, Singh, P. J Friggieri, P. M Gatens, D. Glendinning, P.A Goldman,, P.P Helm, ,... M. Oates, *Death, Contemplation and Schopenhauer*. Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2016.



According to Nihilism, Nietzsche claims the idea that people do not desire pleasure or avoidance of pain, people mostly desire power, experience of power. He asserts the idea of death of God, which leads him not to scare the attitude of dying. In the below passage, he proves his Atheism with killing God:

Where has God gone?' he cried. 'I shall tell you. We have killed him—you and I. We are all his murderers. But how have we done this? How were we able to drink up the sea? Who gave us the sponge to wipe away the entire horizon? What did we do when we unchained this earth from its sun? Whither is it moving now? Whither are we moving now? Away from all suns? Are we not perpetually falling? Backward, sideward, forward, in all directions? Is there any up or down left? Are we not straying as through an infinite nothing? Do we not feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become colder? Is more and more night not coming on all the time? Must not lanterns be lit in the morning? (...)'<sup>14</sup>

His only goal to live is being a superman or *Übermensch*. Nietzsche asserts not the beliefs but values. *Übermensch* or overman, superman is described by himself as the man who establishes own values, that needs nobody else, but his own identity. *Übermensch* does not seek for meaning or something to believe. He accepts the idea of nothingness and through this nothingness; he creates his own values by freeing himself from all the bonds, all the social norms. He desires to power of his own. This will of power is actually intrinsic of nature of man which is able to emerge in twofold; one is constructive, the other one is deconstructive. According to Nietzsche, it is constructive to influence the others and his thoughts would be able to be transmitted from generation to generation. In the approach of *Übermensch*, one must suffer from meaninglessness, but this suffering gives him freedom.

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<sup>14</sup> Friedrich Nietzsche, *The Gay Science* (1882, 1887) para. 125; Walter Kaufmann ed. New York: Vintage, 1974, pp.181-82.

Übermensch is the god of himself. He creates himself from nothingness, it is also called self-overcoming.

### **1.5. Heidegger' Theories on Death and Dasein**

After Nietzsche's Nihilist philosophy, Heidegger comes with his theories of Dasein, authenticity and death. He is one of the most influential philosophers of his time. His theory begins with Dasein and continues with authenticity and theory of death.

Heidegger assumes the term "Dasein" for human being. "Da" stands for "There" in German and "Sein" stands for "Being" so that all the term means "Being there". Especially as Yalom(1980) suggests, Heidegger has tried to emphasize dual nature of human being. To explain his theory, people are subjected subject, but on the other hand they are in charge of constituting themselves and their world. It claims that human being is represented by two binary oppositions in the world that they are affected and they affect. Heidegger's ontological framework of being there or in the world gives the impression that Dasein has to be distracted from other objects and subjects; on the contrary, Dasein has to protect relation with world and environment. He argues that Dasein is not able to separate from other subjects and objects genuinely, purely. Dasein's ontological existence needs to connect with environment.

In his book *Time and Being*, he assumes that Da Sein has its being in its existence. Dasein does not exist thanks to its characteristics; the only explanation of its existence emerges from its own being. Heidegger explains his act of giving name as Dasein, as it differentiates the being from other objects, as table, tree or house. Dasein has its own essence, own existence and being. According to Heidegger, Dasein is always ego-centric, who is neither aware, nor unaware about its existence. In the process of becoming Dasein, one is in a space between aware and unaware its existence, one approaches being aware of its existence and the process begins.

Each Dasein is connected with life and death. In instance which is given by Heidegger, Dasein is connected with time in three stages: existence, thrownness and fallenness. Existence stands for future, thrownness stands for past and fallenness is the most significant part of Dasein life which stands for present that involves a moment

to moment basis. Dasein struggle begins with present. Dasein's inevitable becoming process starts with awareness of the self that comes from awareness of finitude of human existence. Heidegger assumes it being-towards-death.

According to other previous philosophers asserted the idea that death is the most terrific experience of human being. Though, Heidegger assumes that it is not same with Dasein. Death is the most precious moment of Dasein's life. With Dasein's awareness of himself and death leads a private, unique bond between death.

Heidegger develops another theory about Dasein existence, which has twofold being in the world; one mode is forgetfulness of being everydayness (Alitaglichkeit), it is inauthentic way of existence, the other one is mode of mindfulness of being, ontological mode, and awareness comes with authenticity. These two modes have distinction about being aware of death and unaware of death. The period which human being is unaware of death is only waste of time and these kinds of human beings are not able to be Dasein. Human being becomes Dasein with awareness of death. Death gives great authenticity that Dasein gets in process of great struggle to establish the self. Everydayness is a necessary for the process that Dasein has to pass through. Actually, the one prepares its being to Dasein in its life as everydayness, unconsciously every act that the one performs and every decisions that it makes has traces of its being and existence those are the substance of Dasein.

As an existence, Dasein designates itself in its environment and situations. More or less it leads Dasein to understand its being and the self. This everydayness mode is not like nothingness, in the fact that it is its positive phenomenal characteristic. Heidegger projects that this everydayness and being ordinary are always condemned to be overlooked. They are assumed as being common, known, easily understandable are the most complex and obscure subjects that their existential significance are easily overlooked. Average everydayness is actual existential a priori of Dasein.

Heidegger discusses another term in his book, as *kategoreisthai*<sup>15</sup>. In its first meaning, it signifies accusing someone obviously in the public or society. In existential concern, it has a meaning as saying to the face of the existed one how it

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<sup>15</sup> M. Heidegger, *Being and time*, United States: Stellar Books, 2013,p.45

exists by the self as everyone is able to see it. This speech occurs at the level of inner self. The things which are seen and visible ones in this kind of seeing are called *kategoriari*<sup>16</sup>. Existentials and categories are the two fundamental possibilities of the being.

According to Heidegger, based on thrownness in this situation of everydayness, human beings find themselves in self-imposed servitude. Heidegger gives the basic binary opposition of this inauthentic mode, which is the self (*das Mann*) and human being's own self, individuality. In the authentic mode, human being becomes *Dasein*, gains great awareness of death and the self. *Dasein* gets in great struggle, which is the most painful process that one is able to experience. In this mode, *Dasein* escapes from banality of life and grasps the awareness. Death ascends *Dasein* to superior position from ordinary people.

Ordinary people are unwilling to reflect about death. Thus, Heidegger assumes that death always accompanies human being in every moment of their life:

(i)n such a way of talking, death is understood as an indefinite something which, above all, must duly arrive from somewhere or other, but which is proximally not yet present- at-hand for oneself, and is therefore no threat <sup>17</sup> The they-self supports such illusions and provides a constant tranquillization about death. <sup>18</sup>

In everydayness, ordinary people live in ignorant mode from their real responsibility, which is the awareness of the self and death. Heidegger calls this situation as *Heimlich*, which describes human being's comfortableness.

In the awaking experience, *Dasein* has two different concepts; anxiety and fear. The awaking experience emerges when human being's everydayness subsides and then the authentic mode arouses. After this authentic mode, *Dasein* barges in process of becoming. Firstly, *Dasein* feels anxiety which comes from freedom. *Dasein* was constituted by these societal circumstances. Then, *Dasein*'s status alters to who constitutes; first time feels freedom which is unknown for *Dasein*. It leads to anxiety, *Dasein* feels fear for unknown. Then this anxiety, this fear modifies itself as

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<sup>16</sup> M. Heidegger, *Being and time*, United States: Stellar Books, 2013,p.45

<sup>17</sup> A.B.Hakim, *Historical introduction to philosophy*. Routledge, 2017,.p 297

<sup>18</sup> Ibid: 298

fear for existence. Dasein gets in a great chaotic status to find the self. This struggle makes human being Dasein. If this life is assumed as a game or chess, human being changes position from player to observer or Dasein becomes a player rather than a chess pawn.

When Dasein faces with death, Heidegger gives statement:

(...) reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, (...) in an impassioned freedom towards death, a freedom which has been released from the illusions of the “they”<sup>19</sup>

In other theories, Heidegger asserts the experience and nonexistence or inexistence. According to Heidegger, inexistence is able to be achieved only by death and through dying process. On the other hand Heidegger claims the idea that all previous attempts to grasp meaning of existence are useless and he preserves his statement by “*Existence is a way of understanding what constitutes his own existence*”<sup>20</sup>.

In accordance with his statement, existence is the constant self-awareness. Nevertheless, the other debate emerges concerning inexistence, specifically how one can achieve inexistence. The same question is asked by Heidegger as well. He replies simply, by death.

Heidegger emerges with idea that Dasein needs a shelter, hometown to alter his status as self-awareness. Nonetheless, death is a great threat for sense of safety.

Existence is not special for all creatures. Existence is achieved only by human beings. The creature has to question and seek for answer, should struggle in this process. In Heidegger’s ontological framework, animals cannot achieve existence. Because they cannot question and struggle for the answer. They live in the moment. On the other hand, human beings who insist on living thrownness and everydayness are not able to achieve authentic life and sequentially, cannot reach existence. Existence forces to question, think, concern. In that manner, death is the most certain possibility of existence. Death forces human being to concern about life.

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<sup>19</sup> M. Heidegger, *Being and time*, United States: Stellar Books, 2013, p.311

<sup>20</sup> M.Heidegger, *What is metaphysics?*, Siavash Jamadi Translation. Phoneix Publishing, 2014, p.299

Heidegger discusses that existence gives possibility of inexistence. Death is the moment of awareness of everything. However, Existence involves all the life and death. Existence cannot be grasped only by death or only by life. It has wholeness in that meaning.

Inexistence cannot be limited to death only, it is origin of everything. Everything evokes from inexistence. Inexistence is revealed with experience of fear (Angst). Fear is the reflection of inner state. In that case, existence comes from nonexistence. If the human being accepts the fear, fear is a road to existence through inexistence. The basis of inexistence is source of existence.

The process of dying or process of facing with death demand human being to think and concern about life and questioning about existence. Facing with nothingness leads human being to think about the self-existence and inexistence. In this process human being gets away from the limited view of life and extends the view with questioning about the existence, inexistence and the self. When human being faces with inexistence, anxiety arouses:

Anxiety in the face of death is not equal to fear of death, and it does not indicate a “weak” person or an arbitrary and random event, but as found from the stem Existence, Existence is open to the fact that they are launched towards the end of existence”<sup>21</sup>

He focuses on the fear of death and anxiety as Epicureans has done before. Notwithstanding, Heidegger contradicts Epicurean theory about fear of death. He preserves the idea that anxiety and fear of death are natural for human beings:

When experiencing anxiety in the face of death, Existence is a possibility left to overtake, to be brought. That anxiety is converted to the anxiety or fear of the events that are approaching. In addition, anxiety as fear is ambiguous and is seen as a weakness that Existence with confidence should be familiar with. One must cultivate such indifference to *overcome* Existence with most of its affiliates.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>21</sup> M. Heidegger, *What is metaphysics?*. Siavash Jamadi Translation. Phoneix Publishing, 2014, p.324

<sup>22</sup> Ibid:327-28

According to Heidegger, death has a role of mirror; it reflects the self of human being and gives perfect self-awareness:

Existence is not complete with death and does not simply disappear; it is not even ready or fully accessible. On the contrary, Existence is always ahead of his not-yet, as its front end. It is determined that death is in no way intended to imply existence, but towards the end (being towards the end), this is implicated. Death is a manner of existence as soon as it takes it for itself<sup>23</sup>

Alternatively, Heidegger is concerned about death of others. In his ontological framework, it is very different and effective experience that witnessing another human being's death or dying process. Still, it is impossible to experience that process instead of that human being. Death is unique, like fingerprints, which every human being experiences this transformation of existence to inexistence.

Any human being could experience the dying process like the dying one. The one who is witnessing has to handle with grief and sense of loss. In these senses, any human being cannot try to experience dying process, cannot achieve that kind of awareness. Heidegger distinguishes two terms as not being alive and without living. One is survivor, the other one is deceased. Not being alive means more living than without living for Heidegger. Death is possibility of Existence.

## 1.6 Foucault's Theories on Death and Dying

He lived between 1926 and 1984. He was one of the main representatives of Western philosophy in his period. He is influenced by Nietzsche's philosophy. His theories focus on structural and phenomenological readings of history and philosophy.

His theories about death are more controversial in his period. Especially his idea about man is a *recent invention*<sup>24</sup> that promised to *an imminent death*<sup>25</sup> and strengthens his ideas with an instance as *face drawn in the sand at the edge of the*

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<sup>23</sup> M. Heidegger, *What is metaphysics?*. Siavash Jamadi Translation. Phoenix Publishing, 2014, p.327

<sup>24</sup> T. OLeary, & C.Falzon, *Foucault and philosophy*, Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p.386

<sup>25</sup> Ibid: 386

sea. <sup>26</sup>He is anti- humanist and he has three fundamentals about rejection of humanism: firstly, conceptual or philosophical, secondly, strategic, and lastly normative. His rejection is motivated by his ideas about “death of man”.

His theories about death of man and his statement: “*Man is the creation of the end of 18<sup>th</sup> century*”<sup>27</sup> were controversial. He was criticized by contemporary philosophers and authors such as Sartre and Garaudy, who are great representatives of humanism. Especially Sartre projects his rejection:

Man’ does not exist, and Marx had rejected him long before Foucault or Lacan when he said: ‘I don’t see any man, I only see workers, bourgeois, intellectuals’. If one persists in calling ‘subject’ a sort of substantial I (...) then the subject has been dead for a long time. But the initial decentering which makes man disappears behind the structures implies in itself a form of negativity, and man surges from this negation. There is a subject or subjectivity if you prefer, as soon as there is an effort to overcome while retaining a given situation. (Sartre 1994: 70)

Although, Sartre and Garaudy seem like in the same page against to Foucault, their concerns are so different from each other. Garaudy is religious-based sees human as bearer of rights. Though Sartre is secular and rejects these moral abstractions, he defends surging from negotiation. In their cases actually both of them overlook the point what Foucault refers when he mentions *man*. He develops a great paradox about death of man, which is not simple to comprehend. Foucault defends his theory, with using terms as historical a priori that modern man only transferable in its speaking existence with the finitude so that paradox triggers new comprehension of finitude is man. Foucault stress on the difference between surface meaning of death of man and the other as historical a priori. Surface meaning is that

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<sup>26</sup>T. OLeary, & C.Falzon, *Foucault and philosophy*, Chichester, U.K.: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010, p.387

<sup>27</sup>G. Garaudy, ‘Structuralisme et mort de l’homme’, in Michel Foucault : Critical Assessments,ed. Barry Smart, volume 1, 1994,p 386.

Garaudy claims this statement as:

“When he tells us that man is a creation of the end of the 18th century, I would like Foucault to explain us where he is going to locate Augustine’s Confessions or even the research of the Greek fathers who, from the notion of the divine person, and then from Christology, arrived at the notion of the human person.”



death of man as unable to live, speak, think, losing the consciousness forever. In the historical a priori, the term is based on comprehension. It is a kind of a historical episteme that has different conception and meaning in each situation. Foucault's man actually has empirical and transcendental double.

On the other passage, he gives another meaning the finitude beside determination:

In one sense, man is governed by labour, life and language: his concrete existence finds its determinations in them. (...) [Yet] all those contents (...) have positivity within the space of knowledge (...) only because they are thoroughly imbued with finitude. For they would not be there (...) if man (...) was trapped in the mute (...) opening of animal life; but nor would they posit themselves in the acute angle that hides them from their own direction if man could traverse them without residuum in the lightning flash of an infinite understanding. That is to say that each of these forms in which man can learn that he is finite is given to him only against the background of his own finitude. Moreover, the latter is not the most completely purified essence of positivity, but that upon the basis of which it is possible for positivity to arise. At the foundation of all the empirical positivities (...), we discover a finitude – which is in a sense the same (...) and yet is radically other.<sup>28</sup>

In the passage above, finitude refers to empirical, and transcendental, determination is causal and epidemic. Empirical finitude could be explained that people become ill, older but, they are not able to change their biochemistry. These situations as aging, illness and other struggles project that the man is empirically finite. These conditions are life, labour and language. People are dependent on these three concepts and this dependence and limitation are transcendental to the man. Determination is causal because it leads an act with a cause. It is epidemic because it is an a priori condition. These limitations and determination prohibit man to grasp the infinite meaning.

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<sup>28</sup> M. Foucault, *The Order of Things*, .N.Y: Random House USA Inc, 1994, p. 313-4

Although, it is the fact that man cannot formulate any empirical knowledge by its own, it needs some external input. In this meaning, empirical matter is not positivity's purified essence.

According to Foucault's theory, the main problem that stands front of the empiricity is ambiguity of man:

(...) which both separates and unites the empirical and the transcendental, causes the two forms of finitude to overlap by means of an implicit shift which makes epistemic determination ultimately dependent on its empirical, causal counterpart: the relation between transcendental and empirical finitude becomes a vicious circle.<sup>29</sup>

On the other concept, Foucault refers to structural embodiment of the man that is on its way out anyway. Man is in the systems of structures; even he is not able to comprehend this system.

The man is depended and structured by senses as time and space. On this point, time is an a priori form of sensibility that depends on the possibility of existence. It opens epistemic field in empirical time. It has several kinds of finitudes. The analytic of finitude was defined itself with a paradox of retrospection by means of transcendental finitude which is exposed as pre-existing itself in empirical finitude's form. Man's ability becomes invalid to provide a necessary and universal foundation for knowledge.

Transcendental finitude and empirical finitude coincide in a way that the former rather than being analytic link of the term of a transcendental point of view, is now cash out in terms of the synthetic, empirical limitations that bear incidentally on man: "*Thus man as a transcendental subject 'unveils himself as already there, as a living being' governed by the empirical laws of life, a speaking being using a language that preexists him.*"<sup>30</sup>

Foucault also focuses on the idea of human freedom. The idea of human freedom is doubly assumed as wicked. It causes epistemological mistake that

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<sup>29</sup> B.Han-Pile, (n.d.). The "Death of Man": Foucault and Anti-Humanism. *Foucault and Philosophy*, 118-142. doi:10.1002/9781444320091.ch6. p. 11

<sup>30</sup> Ibid:12

includes ignoring random determinations that is interested in human beings and it produces fallacious normative ideals focus on the idea of authenticity as the return to man's true nature.<sup>31</sup>

### 1.7 Baudrillard's Theories on Death and Simulacra

He is a French philosopher mostly famous for his theory of hyperreality and simulacra, simulacrum. According to his theory, simulacra are not a territory or substance or referential being. "*It is the generation by models of a real without origin or reality: a hyperreal*"<sup>32</sup>. He uses the term of map that loses its traces slowly, the map to originality. It is real that, only the vestiges are left in the desert. The empire of originality does no longer exist, but it still has its vestiges. The desert itself becomes a reality by its own.

In his concern, fable is useless in that only allegory remains. In the present-day simulators does not focus on map or territory for reality or originality. People in postmodern era are enchanted by charm of abstraction. In the postmodern era, it has no map or territory, this *representational imagery* disappears with simulation. Representational imagery has no longer coextensivity between map and territory. Its line between reality and representational imagery is blurred. In this process, mirror of being, appearances, imaginary coextensivity disappear. This operation is nuclear and genetic, rather than specular and discursive as before. Simulation is emerged by genetic miniaturization. "*The real produced from miniaturized units, from matrices, memory banks, and command models- and with these it can be reproduced an indefinite number of times.*"<sup>33</sup> It is no more real than an operational. In fact that it is unable to embrace by imagery, it is unable to be called as real, which is hyperreal. It is created in a hyperspace that has no atmosphere.

Baudrillard emphasizes that hyperspace is somewhere that has no real or truth. It is simulation age which begins by *liquidation of all referentials*<sup>34</sup>. The philosopher likens this process as artificial resurrection in system of signs. In this

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<sup>31</sup>Han-Pile, B. Ibid: 16

<sup>32</sup> J.Baudrillard, M.Poster, *Selected writings*, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2001, p.166.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid:167

<sup>34</sup> Ibid:167

space, material gains more significance than meaning. It's far beyond imitation, reduplication or even parody. Baudrillard explains this concept as following:

It is rather a question of substituting signs of the real for the real itself; that is, an operation to deter every real process by its operational double, a metastable, programmatic, perfect descriptive machine which provides all the signs of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes.<sup>35</sup>

It is not possible again producing real again. It is death of real, system of death. Even hyperreal is produced by imagery, it extinguishes irrevocably the line between real and imagery, and it leaves the age for *simulated generation of difference* and *orbital recurrence of models*.<sup>36</sup>

The simulation resembles the real, but it is like feigning to be. One is presence, the other is absence. However, in the case of feigning, the difference between real and imagery or false or true is obvious and clear. In the case of simulation this difference is blurred and the all the false, the truth, real and imagery one mix together. Baudrillard clarifies this situation with using instance of illness. Someone who feigns being ill, is able to being ill easily. In this concern, simulator gives true symptoms of illness so that it is impossible distinguish whether the illness or feigning. Truth becomes subjective that it is unable to grasp anymore.

Simulacrum is no able to emerge suddenly: It has a process for becoming. In this meaning, Baudrillard has four stages to emerge simulacrum:

- 1) It is reflection of a basic reality.
- 2) It masks and perverts a basic reality.
- 3) It masks the absence of a basic reality.
- 4) It bears no relation to any reality whatever; it is its own pure simulacrum.<sup>37</sup>

In the first stage, the subject has good appearance; it is source of good reference. In the second stage, it is representation of malice; subject's bad features

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<sup>35</sup> Ibid:167

<sup>36</sup> Ibid:167

<sup>37</sup> Ibid:170

become visible and obvious. In the third stage, it feigns as an appearance, it is kind of sorcery that has no real or original source. Finally, in the fourth stage: it is no longer a appearance, it is pure product of simulation. Baudrillard clarifies these stages:

Conversely, simulation starts from the Utopia of this principle of equivalence, *from the radical negation of the sign as value*, from the sign as reversion and death sentence of every reference. Whereas representation tries to absorb simulation by interpreting it as false representation, simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation as itself a simulacrum.<sup>38</sup>

His other theory, which is symbolic exchange, has a different approach from other contemporary philosophers. Baudrillard believes that everything is an exchange. Even theories have symbolic exchange. Negativity has opponent as positivity. Life has death. It is called as counter-gift which is consisted of reversibility of the gift. It is cyclical reversal as it changes all the linearity of time, language, power. For humankind, this counter-gift comes with extermination and death. It has symbolic, ineluctable form that is neither mystical nor structural. The reality principle is exchanged with hyperreality, since reality is absorbed by hyperreality of simulation. So, the reality principle is altered, as principle of simulation. It is the first stage of simulacra in society. In the social life which is dominated by principle of simulation, finalities are exterminated that it is an infinite cycle. In this principle of simulation, ideology has no place for itself and hegemonic powers are uses successive simulacra in law of value. Simulacra create so-called truth and the masses are ruled by these simulacra without any consciousness, significance, and self-determination. This is second stage of simulacra, that masses are ruled by fear and malice. The third stage has different kind of revolution that only has hyperreality. All these revolutions are called beside with terms like liberation, value, transparency. These are the fantasies and phantoms that are used for manipulation of masses. As it is seen, simulacra has great amount of tautology.

In accordance with Baudrillard, identity is defenceless when it faces with death. Death has counter-gifted. In that case, Baudrillard concerns as “*Death must be*

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<sup>38</sup> Baudrillard, J. Ibid:167

*played against death*<sup>39</sup>. It is a radical tautology. Death is the one which waits for humankind effortlessly and extermination waits for system as well. Death has counter-finality. In the term of mortality, every human being is trapped to die. That means, people adjust to the idea of death. This adjustment forces death to be normalized. In this process, death is ignored by people until the moment of dying. Through passage of time, death is died by others' deaths.

### **1.8. Derrida' Theories on Death and Historicity**

Derrida's main theory is deconstruction and it has critical examination with conceptual distinctions and oppositions. These oppositions are characterized as binary and hierarchical. His examinations consist of speech and writing, mind and body, presence and absence, inside and outside, literal and metaphorical, intelligible and sensible, form and meaning.<sup>40</sup>

Derrida deconstructs these oppositions to disclose the tensions and contradictions between hierarchical ordering, especially the meaning whether is implicit or indirect. It projects the idea that binary oppositions are not natural or necessary. His example as speech and writing is relevant: speech is more authentic form of language than writing. Speech expresses the speaker's ideas directly, presently. Yet, writing is more absent and remote therefore is able to misunderstand easily. This difference between writing and speech is that speech is more traditional and direct, but writing is innovative and easily misunderstood.

Derrida's other theory is about historicity. He thinks that European historians misunderstood historicity. Their misunderstanding's first link is historicity to responsibility:

(...) is explained on the contrary by the extent to which their historical knowledge occludes, confines, or saturates those questions, grounds, or abysses, naively presuming to totalize or naturalize them, or, what amounts to the same

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<sup>39</sup> Baudrillard, J. Ibid:123

<sup>40</sup> B.Duignan,. *The 100 most influential philosophers*. New York, NY: Britannica Educational Pub. In association with Fall River Press, 2011.

thing, losing themselves in the details. For at the heart of this history there is something of an abyss [*il y a de l'abfme*], an abyss that resists totalizing summary. Separating orgiastic mystery from Christian mystery, this abyss also announces the origin of responsibility.<sup>41</sup>

Derrida asserts that modern people do not understand the history adequately. He believes that history cannot be resolved and it remains problematic. The danger of present time is that excessive knowledge of detail might lead people to forget the real question. The question is whether historical man is able to acknowledge history.

Historicity always remains a secret. Historical man does not desire to admit historicity and sabotages his own historicity. Derrida believes that these two reasons lead a kind of resistance:

On the one hand, the history of responsibility is tied to a history of religion. But there is always a risk in acknowledging a *history* of responsibility. It is often thought, on the basis of an analysis of the very concepts of responsibility, freedom, or decision, that to be responsible, free, or capable of deciding cannot be something that is acquired, something conditioned or conditional. Even if there is undeniably a history of freedom or responsibility, such a historicity, it is thought, must remain *extrinsic*.<sup>42</sup>

This passage explains Derrida's thought about historicity of responsibility cannot be limited with only history of religion. The other terms and concepts cannot be ignored. All the cultures and religions have different rituals belief, so historicity of responsibility, even if it is conditioned, it cannot be restrained.

The other problem of historicity is that it always remains open with a problem. This problem is never to be solved. In case the problem is resolved, it will be end of historicity; it will come with verdict of nonhistoricity itself. Derrida clarifies his theory that historicity cannot be mastered or decidable object, because it is bond to responsibility, faith and gift. The responsibility makes historicity outside of knowledge or given norms, faith makes historicity beyond knowledge and

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<sup>41</sup> J. Derrida, *Gift of death*. Place of publication not identified: UNIV OF CHICAGO Press, 2017, p.5

<sup>42</sup> Derrida, J. (2017) Ibid:6

certainty. Gift and the gift of death put Derrida transcendence of other; it gives new experience of death. The gift of death is marriage of faith and responsibility.

Derrida defends the idea with these two types of heterogeneous secret: one is secret of historicity in which the historical man desires to acknowledge what concerns responsibility: other secret is orgiastic mystery, which breaks the responsibility of historicity. By this meaning, the history of secrecy is a combination of history of responsibility and of the gift: “*has the spiral form of these turns [tours], intricacies [tourneures], versions, turnings back, bends [virages], and conversions. One could compare it to a history of revolutions, even to history as revolution*”<sup>43</sup>

According to Derrida, the experience of death is another secret. He strengthens his theory with Plato’s orgiastic mystery that has two types as incorporation and repression. Incorporation subordinates, subjects, disciplines the orgiastic mystery but repression retains Platonic mystery. When this all takes place, mourning is a necessary experience that facing with the loss, experience of cold side of death, which everyone will taste eventually. In this very moment, people will have new experience of secrecy; a new structure of responsibility, the mystery is buried memory.

History of secrecy and history of responsibility bond each other in the case of gift of death. Derrida questions “*How does one give oneself death*”.<sup>44</sup> Derrida desires to find the answer to how one can decide to sacrifice own self for other, which even Heidegger defends as impossibility. Derrida believes the possibility of this impossibility. He explains his theory with Socrates’ Phaedo. It is anticipation of death, the meditation for receiving best way of giving death, experience of possibility of death as impossibility.

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<sup>43</sup> Derrida, J. (2017) Ibid:8

<sup>44</sup> Derrida, J. (2017) Ibid:8



## CHAPTER 2

### 2. GENERAL CHARACTERIZATION OF LOUIS DE BERNIÉRES' *BIRDS WITHOUT WINGS*

The novel was published in 2004 by Louis De Bernières. The chronotope was Eskibahçe and the period before establishing present-day Modern Turkey. Eskibahçe was on West Anatolian region, was a small town which lived in peace by multinational society. The town is a home for multiple nations like Greeks, Turks, Bulgarians, Armenians, and they have different religions like Christianity and Islam. They live together peacefully and they only speak Turkish. The period was before World War I and the novel covers approximately 30 years passage of time. It begins with Philothei's birth and ends with Karatavuk's epilogue.

The narration of the book is very different than in his other books. The novel has a great number of narrators and it creates polyphony. The narrator alters according to chapters. Every character has a point of view; every character has different approach and different struggle from each other. This variety enriches the book and delights the reader.

In the Drosula's chapters, there is a narratee, either who is Drosula's grandchild. She narrates Philothei and she is a closer witness for Philothei and İbrahim's love. The narrative begins with Iskander's narration. He narrates Ibrahim the Mad's story which explains why he is mad. Iskander narrates the town and the period as they live together peacefully. Eskibahçe experiences a great excitement because of Philothei's birth. She is the most beautiful girl in the town. Everyone, even Abdulhamit Hodja blesses her birth although she is Christian. Abdulhamit Hodja is concerned her beauty, since it will bring bad luck to the town. Drosula tells the birth of Philothei :*"If the stories are true, she was born beautiful. It was said that the imam declared her to be the most exquisite Christian child that the town had ever seen. They say that her eyes were dark as well water, so that those who leaned over the crib and looked into them had the sensation of falling and whirling."* (De Bernières, 2004, p.24)

Philothei and Ibrahim the Mad's love is one of the subplots of the narrative. Ibrahim the Mad is always different from other children in Eskibahçe. He is obsessed with Philothei, he always follows her every steps. On the other hand, Drosula even though she is ugliest girl in the town, has an obsessed lover, Gerasimos.

The discordance begins with arrival of The Dog. The Dog is very scary, gloomy, maleficent character, who lives in the tombs away from the society. He is kind of welcoming for all who are lost and confused, disappointed. He is savage and his clothes are very dark. Even his smile lacks any kind of beauty and compassion, in fact it is just the opposite, as his smile is formidable. All the kids in the town are frightened because of him, especially Philothei. On the contrary, Karatavuk and Mehmetçik find him very interesting and copy his behaviours and spy him at the tombs.

In the narrative, every character has own words to express their feelings, thoughts and the meaning behind their behaviours. Even though each character is represented as an individual, the novelist stresses out the variety between many of them in terms of binary oppositions. The first narator is Iskander the Potter, the father of Karatavuk. He is a very compassionate father and successful, passionate potter. He is very creative, even Georgio P. Theodorou hears his craftsmanship. Iskander is a very different character from his creativity. He symbolizes a creator, like extraordinary person who comes just after of God.

(...)Iskander asked them, "Why is a potter second only to God?" The boys shook their heads in unison, and Iskander explained, "Because God created everything out of earth, air, fire and water, and these are the very same things that a potter uses to make his vessels. When a potter makes something, he acts in the image of God. (De Bernières ,2004, p.59).

Even though Iskander puts himself second place after God, he is ignorant man who does not know how to read and write. He is a great craftsman, but he is unlearned and traditional.

In direct opposition to Iskander, Rüstem Bey is educated, smart, rich, well-dressed and handsome man. He is another window for outside world. He visits

Istanbul frequently and hunts often. He is the landowner of Eskibahçe. He seeks for his other half, harmony, the whole, a real, compassionate and passionate love. Nevertheless, he is disappointed with his every attempt. His first attempt is with Tamara. She is very cold, noble lady that even Rüstem Bey cannot get closer to her. Their marriage is very cold; they have distance between each other. She always looks through heavy-hearted eyes. He feels her bleakness toward him.

One day he notices a figure that frequently comes to his home every day. He lies in ambush and catches the figure that is veiled and bowed. He discloses the identity of the figure who is Tamara's lover, Selim. Tamara cheats on him with Selim. Rüstem Bey loses his sense and attack Selim with frustration. He punishes Selim by taking his life. Thus, Tamara pays the expensive price for her adulterous and unfaithful act. Rüstem Bey delivers her to centre of town and declares her adulterous act and then let people to stone her to death. Above all these humiliations, Tamara is not concern with Rüstem Bey' or others' thoughts about her. She cries just for her lover's death. Rüstem Bey comprehends that he is not loved by his wife even once in his life. This frustration and disappointment makes him irrational and instinctive.

During the throwing of stones to Tamara, Rüstem Bey regrets his act, but he imagines he does the right thing. Rüstem Bey is always in the doubt and thinks every detail in religious law. Still, his irrational, emotional act makes him guilty in the eyes of Abdulhamit Hodja. Abdulhamit Hodja saves Tamara and brings her to his Nilüfer's barn. His wife, Ayşe cures her wounds and delivers her to the brothel. Tamara loses all her beauty with diseases that she gets from brothel. Rüstem bey represents a postmodern man who in always in doubt, frustration and tries to find truth in reality. After all, he never accomplishes his desire. He is cheated by women who enter his life.

On the other hand, Abdulhamit Hodja is another character who represents some binary oppositions. He is a religious man who should elude himself from earthly desires, but he desires beauty. He is very dependent on his horse, Nilüfer, which is most beautiful horse in the town and even Rüstem Bey's horses cannot compete with her. He gets ill when Nilifer is taken from him during the war

for army. After that separation, Abdulhamit Hodja cannot recover. Abdulhamit Hodja is very calm, tolerant, moral, educated, wise man who teaches religion to other Muslims in the town. People respect him so much. He has a friendly relationship with Father Kristophorus.

The children of the town are very different from each other. Philothei is very beautiful, naïve, sweet girl but her best friend Drosula is the opposite of her. She is very ugly. Even Georgio P. Theodoru realises their binary opposition and finds it very interesting that all the oppositions live together freely and peacefully.

Especially Karatavuk and Mehmetçik's friendship is remarkable above others. They are very depended on each other; they always play together and educate each other. Their friendship has a deep, strong root. Even they are opposite to each other in the subject of religion and culture, they seem alike.

The other boys, Ibrahim the Mad and Gerosimos wait together and follow together Philothei and Drosula, but they do not chat, they just wait silently because they always have a purpose to be together that is waiting for their lovers. On the contrary, Karatavuk and Mehmetçik are together for fun, friendship.

The women of the town are not so different from each other. They have common daily struggles and pleasure like gossip, cooking, chores. They isolate the prostitutes and do not chat with them due to their notorious fame. This isolation makes Rüstem Bey's ladies closer, Tamara and Leyla. The both of them are labelled as prostitutes and cheat Rüstem Bey. Rüstem Bey creates a kind of individual hell, since he never gets the truth he searches for. He lives in what Baudrillard calls hyperreality. Tamara behaves as his wife, but in fact she is never his wife. Leyla behaves as if she was his mistress and a Circassian, but she is not. This hyperreal life leads Rüstem Bey to inner decay.

## **2.1 Apocalyptic Components in Louis De Bernières' *Birds Without Wings***

De Bernières begins to develop the novel with characters' stories one by one. The author desires to create a world which has been close to its end. The novel begins with harmony, accordance and this accordance gradually gets corrupted. This

corruption starts by arrival of The Dog, then is followed by the arrival of Selim, who is referred as Azazel in the study of Tatiana Golban (2015)<sup>45</sup>. After Selim's arrival Tamara Hanım is declared as the prostitute, because of her adulterous act with Selim, where the arrival of The Bride, who is in the fact the truth a prostitute as Leyla Hanım.

All the rights turn to wrongs and everything becomes upside down like Bakhtin's carnivalesque. Everyone wears off their masks and disclose their true self. Especially when all the people throw stones to Tamara Hanım, they show their true identities. This is kind of grotesque moment, because Tamara Hanım is socially superior to others. She is wife of Aga as Rüstem Bey. She is representative of higher class and this incidence gives them power to mock and attack to her:

The first stone was flung half-heartedly, almost humorously, and fell at her feet. She looked down at it and smiled. The second stone was thrown more boldly, and struck her upon the thigh. The third stone flew past her head and glanced off the trunk of one of the planes. A buzz of animal noises began to stir in the crowd, and ugliness spiralled up in it, the evil that emanates as if from nowhere when people are permitted to act basely in a righteous cause. Women whose hearts would normally be brimming with concern and tenderness picked up stones and began to shriek as they hurled them. Children whose parents beat them for throwing stones at dogs fought each other for stones to throw at a young woman. Men for whom it was beneath their dignity to strike a woman picked up stones and bayed like hounds. Faces that were habitually calm and beneficent began to contort with gleeful cruelty, and steadily a malevolent barbarism rose up and began to feed upon itself. It was satisfying, in any case, for those lowly folk to have the opportunity to destroy a spoiled and perfumed darling from a higher walk of life. (De Bernières, 2004, p.129)

As it is seen by the passage, in the beginning people hesitate about the act but then they begin to throw stones without any remorse or frustration. They do not

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<sup>45</sup> T. Golban, "The Apocalypse Myth In Louis de Bernières' Novel *Birds Without Wings*: Rustem Bey And An Individual Apocalyptic Experience In The Kierkegaardian frame",2015.

think about her identity any more. They just act wildly, instinctively. Even children who are symbols of purity act devilishly.

All these incidences project the ideas that end of the world is close. The clues for apocalypse come from the beginning of the narrative. The birth of Philothei gives frightening experience to all of people in the town, especially to Abdulhamit Hodja and Iskander The Potter: "*And upon you be peace,*" he replied, and then added, almost as if he were worried by it, "*It's the prettiest child I've ever seen.*" "*That'll be trouble,*" I said." ( De Bernières, 2004, p.11)

According to Tatiana Golban's study, all these clues are apocalyptic ones, which warn people that the end is getting closer. Beside apocalyptic evidences, the levels of being and demoniac evidences are mixed with each other as if representing an allegorical concept. At the level of being; divine, human, water, animal, vegetable, fire, mineral are included. In the level of demonic concept; Satan/Dragon, Whore, Jezebel, Four Horsemen, Beasts, lion, locusts, Tree of death (Cross) Babylon, desert ,Demons, burning, Sea are involved. Finally the apocalyptic concept has triune god, mother, bride, church, rider of white horse, lamb, lion, four creatures, tree of life, Jerusalem, temple, jewels, angels, light, river of life. (Golban, T. (2015), p.3)

The level of being is revealed in the beginning of the narrative, as people in the town bear all of this concept's elements. Yet, in the middle of the narrative, when the war begins, all these water, minerals, humans, animal are famished. The sense of order is lost all together. Men are in the war; women leave alone and have the entire burden on their shoulders. Animals are taken by army for war. People face with poverty, famine and diseases.

On the other concept, demoniac ones are scattered throughout the entire narrative. They are revealed even in the beginning of the narrative: Thee Dog as Satan, The Whore as Tamara and Leyla Hanım, they are also jezebels Azazel as Selim and so on. On the final concept which is apocalyptic, the narrative includes different kind of symbols such as Jerusalem, which is represented by Eskibahçe as a hometown for all religions, rider of white horse as Abdulhamit Hodja and his

Nilüfer, The Bride as Leyla and Tamara Hanım, the bird's whistles as Rraphales's horn as call for apocalypse.

## 2.2 Representation of Beauty

In the fact, the novelist attempts to project the last period of humanity, history, religion and life. All the characters are searching for a final answer. All of them question the reality, meaning, religion and life. For instance, Rüstem Bey questions reality and meaning of his life. He questions and seeks for his other half desperately. Every attempt that he commits results with disappointment. Every attempt drags him deeper to depression and frustration. He is drowned in this hyperreal life.

On the other hand, Abdulhamit Hodja questions the religion as much other characters. Drosula questions beauty as a perfect grand metanarrative for Lyotard. Drosula clarifies her concern about beauty when she remembers Philothei, but firstly Drosula questions the history and humanity's most tragic curse, which is human condition, aging, dying. Time takes its revenge from all humanity with making them aging and dying. Drosula questions how people think they are the only one and that they are the unique, nevertheless, time and history shows the truth that they are just a grain of sand in universe.

According to this, their beauty or ugliness is not a significant concern as life or death:

“I know it's stupid to claim that one human being is special, or picked out by God, when in fact there are hundreds of millions of human beings in the world, and God knows how many millions of people long dead who have been lost to history, all of whom were probably special to someone (...)”(De Bernières, 2004, p.23 )

Drosula's ideas about history could be explained through Derrida's historicity. History always leaves a problem and a secret. Drosula also defends this idea that history and time bring together beauty and ugliness together and these binary oppositions construct each other. History deconstructs beauty and by aging

and dying beautiful becomes ugliness. According to Foucault, finitude divides into empirical and transcendental. Philothei will never experience empirical one because her death is determined by Ibrahim The Mad as Foucault assumes, determination is causal and epidemic. Ibrahim The Mad is determined in the war by various causes and this determination affects Philothei epidemically.

On the other hand, Foucault also calls this situation as historical priori. People are depended on historical a priori. It is a great paradox as Foucault assumes. Death has surface meaning and historical a priori meaning. Surface meaning as Drosula narrates, death is unable to speak, think, losing consciousness. In the historical a priori, modern man is transferable in its speaking existence. That is the reason Drosula narrates Philothei's story. In this respect, paradox exists with this transferring and becomes comprehensive. That is the way how history teaches people to be humble and subdued. Even though, Drosula claims that Philothei never aged. She died in her early age, murdered by her beloved Ibrahim the Mad. Firstly Drosula sanctifies Philothei's beauty through others' sentences:

If the stories are true, she was born beautiful. It was said that the imam declared her to be the most exquisite Christian child that the town had ever seen. They say that her eyes were dark as well water, so that those who leaned over the crib and looked into them had the sensation of falling and whirling. My father, for instance, I don't mind telling you that he was a brute and a drunk, and there wasn't any man ever born who was harder to love, but even he would tell us: "When I saw her eyes I was afraid of God for the first time in my life. It was as if they belonged to someone who had lived too long and seen too much. They were an angel's eyes, and they made me think of death. I went out and drank some lemon raki to get over it, and then I went into the church to pray, and, I don't know why, but I fell down on the church steps and couldn't be raised. I lay there a long time, with the dogs licking my face, till I woke up again and went in and kissed the icon of the Virgin Mary Panagia Glykophilousa." That is what my father said (...) (De Bernières, 2004, p.26)

Then, Drosula grows concerned with the value of beauty, in terms of good or bad, but Drosula still assumes that Philothei's beauty is something sacred that slaps people's face by a cruel truth:



But it was more than a question of hair and skin and eyes, because what one saw was more than just her beauty. You see, my father, drunkard though he was, was right when he said that she reminded you of death. When you looked at Philothei, you were reminded of a terrible truth, which is that everything decays away and is lost. Beauty is precious, you see, and the more beautiful something is, the more precious it is; and the more precious something is, the more it hurts us that it will fade away; and the more we are hurt by beauty, the more we love the world; and the more we love it, the more we are saddened that it is like finely powdered salt that runs away through the fingers, or is puffed away by the wind, or is washed away by the rain. You see, I am ugly. I have always been ugly. If I had died in my youth no one would have said, "Look how much poorer is the world," but to be entranced by Philothei was to receive a lesson in fate. (De Bernières, 2004, p.28)

After these concerns about beauty, Drosula thanks God for her ugliness and justifies her thoughts. She asserts that she has a peaceful, beautiful life without any kind of tragedy and frustration thanks to her lovely husband. Anyway, Philothei has never found peace. Drosula concerned about remembering memories and her identity. She loses her identity because of the expulsion. She loses her language, culture, home and beautiful friend. She is forced to change her life, and create another hyperreal identity that has no source. Even though she does not speak Greek, she is forced to speak Greek and forget her identity, her past, her own history. And now, she refuses to remember those beautiful and peaceful days because they give much more pain than bitter days.

### **2.3 Harmony of the Oppositions**

The novelist always uses binary oppositions to express the situations and circumstances of those days. When he describes the circumstances of those harsh days out of Eskibahçe, he turns his attention to Mustafa Kemal. The novelist uses the real historical figure to give impression of credibility.

Mustafa Kemal figure represents an opposition to those days' unsuccessful, selfish leaders and rulers. He emerges from bottom. He is well-educated, wise, clever

and intelligent. He revolts against all these unfair, unfortunate situation of the Ottoman Empire. He is founder of modern Turkish Republic. He establishes the country from ill, about to collapse Ottoman Empire. He is represented as a saviour in the apocalyptic frame. He saves humanity from all their sins like a prophet. But at the same time, all wars have consequences and even the innocent people always have to pay the price.

The novelist deconstructs gradually these concepts that every harmony has a disharmony, every saviour sacrifices some people, every beauty vanishes, every meaning changes through the history and discourse according to circumstances.

The town, Eskibahçe is a great place for representing Derrida's binary opposition. All the oppositions live together, as beautiful and ugly, smart and naive, good and bad, moral and immoral, Christian and Muslim. All these diversities create a unity. Eskibahçe is a symbol from Golden Age's Garden of Aden. The name comes from Turkish, which means old garden. The town experiences its their golden times in those days as Iskander expresses.

Eskibahçe is a symbolic microcosm and is described very utopic in the beginning. Every part of the town, every person in the town live in a harmony, little part in harmony creates the whole.

The macrocosm is expressed by Mustafa Kemal. The novelist projects a vision of the world with Mustafa Kemal's life. His life is kind of a window for the reader who is enlightened to see that contemporary world is not very utopic. On the contrary, the war is on the door, Ottoman Empire experiences abolishment and last days. Mustafa Kemal is the centre of the all political, social alterations; He is the one that changes the history and establishes a country. He revives Turkey from its ashes, as if a phoenix. The narrative has a cyclical plot as moving from accordance to discordance and then again to accordance. All changes have a price; this harmony in Eskibahçe will eventually be destroyed by the war, poverty, madness and malice, separation and death.

The meaning alters each time with the change of circumstances. The novelist reveals this idea so beautifully by the example of Karatavuk and Mehmetçik.

Seeking for the meaning begins with their nicknames. One day Iskander the Potter creates two different and beautiful whistles. These whistles sound different each but not even Iskander the Potter who creates the whistles knows how they will sound. Iskander the Potter has a role, like a divine creature, creator. Karatavuk and Mehmetçik are kind of his angels who whistle:

(...)I've made you some musical birds," he said. "Give them back to me, and I'll show you. You half fill them with water, like this, and then you blow down the whistle." Iskander tried some experimental puffs, emptied a little water out of each, and then blew again, placing one at each corner of his mouth. To the amazement and delight of the little boys, a torrent of birdsong cascaded out of the terracotta birds, liquid, warbling and utterly enchanting. They jumped up and down with pleasure, and, forgetting their manners, reached out their hands, impatient to receive them. "This one," said Iskander, "sounds exactly like a karatavuk." He gave it to his son, asking, "You know the karatavuk? The one which is completely black and has the yellow beak? It goes vuk vuk vuk in the oleander to warn you away, and then it praises God at the top of the tree in the evening." Iskander gave the other to Nicos, saying, "and this one sounds like a mehmetçik, which some people call kizilgerdan and some call the fire-nightingale." (De Bernières, 2004, p.60-61)

In this chapter, Karatavuk and Mehmetçik take their names. As it is seen, Mehmetçik is kind of compass for Karatavuk. He follows Karatavuk's acts and behaves according to them. They are as united as spheres. Their nicknames are bird's names. This episode functions as a foreshadowing for readers, since this sentence foretells their future as: "*Man is a bird without wings,*" Iskander told them, "*and a bird is a man without sorrows.*" (De Bernières, 2004, p.61). In this respect, symbol of bird has been used for many times by authors, poets or dramatists. It symbolizes spiritual superiority and elevation. It never descends to human's level. Birds never experience sorrow, pain or being entrapped until they come across humankind.

On the contrary, humankind is always entrapped with human condition; lose their liberty by desires and greed. These two features compel people to break their wings of liberty, lead them immorality, spiritual impureness, ignorance. Birds reaches acknowledgement of life and death without experiencing all sorrow, pain of

loss. Birds live in present, no past or future. This forgetting leads to happiness. People are damned to experience the past by remembering. It forces people to anchor the point they suffer, embarrass or happiness, hope. People anchor to memories. Karatavuk also writes a letter to Mehmetçik about his missing and desires to become little kids as before:

You and I once fancied ourselves as birds, and we were very happy even when we flapped our wings and fell down and bruised ourselves, but the truth is that we were birds without wings. You were a robin and I was a blackbird, and there were some who were eagles, or vultures, or pretty goldfinches, but none of us had wings.

For birds with wings nothing changes; they fly where they will and they know nothing about borders and their quarrels are very small.

But we are always confined to earth, no matter how much we climb to the high places and flap our arms. Because we cannot fly, we are condemned to do things that do not agree with us. Because we have no wings we are pushed into struggles and abominations that we did not seek, and then, after all that, the years go by, the mountains are levelled, the valleys rise, the rivers are blocked by sand and the cliffs fall into the sea. (De Bernières, 2004, p. 749)

According to Karatavuk, humans are confined to earth with struggles, desires, suffering. In the novel's final scene, Karatavuk performs last characteristic of Dasein, which he knows himself and accepts all traits of his being. He accepts his flaws and achievements. Nonetheless, he tries to leave a memoir for his best friend Mehmetçik. He tries to create an eternal remembrance even though Mehmetçik will never know it. He confesses his fragmentariness by missing his other half, who is his best friend. He struggles with unwholeness because of Mehmetçik's absence. Karatavuk practises Foucault's theory that freedom is wicked and fallacious. This illusion of freedom causes determination of mistakes and these mistakes force the man to fall down.

Mehmetçik descends in every attempt for ascending. He always tries to be moral, virtuous one but he is doomed to be opposite, as like him, Ibrahim the Mad, the more he tries to conserve his morality, identity and virtue, the more he is

entrapped by moral transgression. Only Karatavuk survives from moral transgression, but he cannot elevate spiritually as birds because of his memory. All the characters in the novel, even though some of them are Daseins, lose their wings thanks to human condition.

In the next chapters, all characters are obliged to suffer. Except that, Karatavuk and Mehmetçik are always bound to each other. They are very different from other children in the village. Their dependence on each other is on another level. This friendship is expressed throughout the narrative from beginning until the end.

In the last chapters, Karatavuk shows his bond with Mehmetçik; he saves his life by wearing his red shirt. Mehmetçik wears red and Karatavuk wears black. Even these colours foreshadow their future. Mehmetçik becomes a criminal, war deserter, and bandit. Karatavuk is a soldier with his honour and his future is well-shape by virtue of his decisions. Karatavuk establishes his identity with Mehmetçik.

It is undeniable influence that Mehmetçik elevates Karatavuk with his friendship and knowledge. Mehmetçik is a window for Karatavuk who helps him to see outside world. They question the world together. Nevertheless, Karatavuk is the one who accomplishes becoming a Dasein. Mehmetçik and Ibrahim the Mad fail to establish their identity and they are determined by environmental events and circumstances. Mehmetçik becomes a criminal; İbrahim The Mad becomes insane because of the circumstances.

On the other hand, Karatavuk always decides his own fate and future, every events and incidences that happen on behalf of Karatavuk's decisions. That is the reason, Mehmetçik is determined and limited. He is unable to grasp the ultimate meaning.

## CHAPTER 3

### 3. THE REPRESENTATIONS OF DEATH IN LOUIS DE BERNIÉRES' *BIRDS WITHOUT WINGS*

In the novel, De Bernières comes with lots of representations of death. The characters behave differently when they face with death. Some of them suffer so deeply and entrapped by agony. Nonetheless, some of the characters like Karatavuk does not lose their rationality and does not entrapped by sentimentality. Karatavuk is differentiated from other characters with his perks of being Dasein. In this concern, Karatavuk behaves so differently than others, when he faces with deaths so many times, when he sees dead bodies, his actions change and improve slowly.

#### 3.1 Karatavuk as a Representative of Dasein

In the beginning of the narrative, Karatavuk is a little child who runs and plays around happily with his best friend Mehmetçik. Their friendship is deeper than it is seen. They complete each other as like hemispheres. They never find peace beside others anymore and always feel the lack of their togetherness. This togetherness is not something romantic or childish. Their togetherness is necessary for their identities. They influence each other and establish their identities, learn, play, defend, save each other.

(...)They were idly tossing small stones across the track, their target a small burrow made in the opposite bank by a mouse. "Why don't we pee in the hole?" suggested Mehmetçik. "Then the mouse might come out, and we can catch it."Karatavuk frowned. "I don't want to catch a mouse." Karatavuk always wanted to appear more serious and adult than he really was, and it is more than likely that he would have liked to urinate in the hole to make the mouse come out, if only he had thought of it first. "Anyway," said Mehmetçik, "if we pee in the mouse hole, we might drown it."Karatavuk nodded wisely in agreement, and the two boys continued to toss their stones. (De Bernières, 2004, p.40)

As it is seen in the passage, they always learn together but Karatavuk is the one who always questions and determines what they do. They learn together but their approaches are different from each other. Karatavuk learns writing and reading from Mehmetçik. They take their nicknames as union which is very meaningful and symbolic for their fate. They are birds who are not able to fly, entrapped by earth.

They are from different cultures and religions but this is never a topic for debate. They complete each other in accordance. Other children like Philothei, Ibrahim the Goat, Gerasimos and Drosula are limited with their little romantic world. Couples protect, love, follow each other. They are determined by each other. On the other hand, together Karatavuk and Mehmetçik is a very different couple. They make same things each other but in the frame of brotherhood and their relationship is more useful than others. These two are most curious ones who try to discover everything in the town. They are the most independent ones in the town. Notwithstanding, it does not last so long. When war is declared and Karatavuk's father, Iskander the Potter is taken by the military for army, Karatavuk makes a deal with soldiers and takes his father's place. When Mehmetçik sees that, even though he is not Muslim, he comes forward to army but soldiers do not accept him as soldier because he is Christian and Greek. That means their separation and discordance begins. During the separation, they promise to each other to take their whistles along.

The war signifies the beginning of Karatavuk's process for becoming Dasein. He starts to question everything that he has been certain before, everything becomes blurring like religion, fate, death:

When I think back to those early days, the first thing I recall was that all of us believed it was a holy war. We were told this over and over again, and every unit had an imam who repeated it to us, and the Sultan himself declared that it was a jihad. As the first fighting broke out on the Feast of the Sacrifice, we all understood that it was we who were the lambs. (De Bernières (2004), p.426)

In this passage, Karatavuk faces with first manipulation and simulacra of holy war. It is not a holy war. Moreover, they are the lambs to be sacrificed for blind, covetous, self-centered rulers. They are the pawns in the chess table.

His first doubt triggers some other doubts as like:

(...) I will say now that I doubt if there is any such thing as a holy war, because war is unholy by nature, just as a dog is a dog by nature, and I will say now, since no one will read these lines until I am dead, that in my opinion there is no God either. I think this because I have seen too many evil things and I have done too many evil things even when I believed in Him, and I think that if there was a God He would have prevented all these evil things. These are thoughts that I have not dared to say to anyone, and every Friday I go to the mosque like everyone else, and I move the beads on my tespih. I observe the fast at ramadan, and I touch my forehead to the ground when I make my salats, but all the time I am wondering how many of those doing the same things around me are respectable hypocrites like me. I will say that if there is no God, then everything is inexplicable, and that would be very hard for us, but if there is God, then He is not good. Now that the years have passed by I will say that the war was sacred for a different reason, and this reason is that it caused Turkey to be born out of the empire, which was mother of it, and gave birth to it as she lay dying. (De Bernières, 2004, p.426)

All these doubts make Karatavuk more sceptical and destabilise everything that he thinks he knows. The doubt about Holy War makes him doubt about religion, God and existence. He still prays but now he is away from dogmatism. He believes that doubt spreads like water. It is the beginning of process. According to Heidegger, in the preparation phase, the one's decisions prepare him to becoming Dasein. The one determines his future and circumstances. His everydayness prepares him and his being for Dasein. He exists for himself. This process of preparation levels up after the one begins to questioning.

In previous chapters, Karatavuk is not self-centered character who lives for himself. He learns it in the war. It is the only way to survive in the war as a result of pain and disappointment. He exits from the everydayness mode and enters in the authentic mode. This mode leads him to understand his being firstly.

In the Heidegger's theory, desperation does not make Dasein detach from his possibilities and the self. On the contrary, it is only another mode of existence. On the fundamental of Dasein, fragmentariness has a greatly large place. If Dasein



completes himself, it means he does not exist anymore, it is nothingness of Dasein. That is reason; Dasein always struggles with fragmentariness for the sake of its existence. In this concern, reader is able to see Karatavuk as seeking for something which is missing. In the beginning, it is his best friend Mehmetçik, and then it changes according to circumstances. In the war, they have lack of a great leader. This deficiency ends with Mustafa Kemal's appointment. After that another deficiency comes with clothes, food and water as essential needs for survival. In these circumstances, essential needs force them to become inhumane. The lack of empathy comes with lack of essential needs.

### **3.1.1 Comparison of Karatavuk as Dasein and Other Male Characters in Louis De Bernières' *Birds Without Wings***

In the war, all three male characters of the narrative as Mehmetçik, Karatavuk and İbrahim the Mad are affected differently. Karatavuk accomplishes becoming Dasein and returns to his home with peaceful authentic mode. On the other hand, Mehmetçik and İbrahim the Mad are the unsuccessful ones who lose the path and deviate from their purpose.

The most deviated one is İbrahim the Mad. He experiences harsh things and he is not strong, enough like Karatavuk, and he loses his rationality. He does immoral things that he is forced by his superiors to do. That is the reason he is not able to survive this kind of trauma and when he returns, he cannot handle with these experiences. He has inner struggle that his rational side fights with irrational side and irrational side wins every time. His tiny conscious, rational side tells the story behind his madness:

They like to call me Ibrahim the Mad, even to my face, because they think I am beyond understanding, but there is a little part of me that never went mad, and this little part is like a tiny man who lives in the corner of my head, and he watches the rest of me being mad, and thinks about it and makes comments about it, and sometimes when I am very mad he becomes frightened and hides in my head or somewhere else in my body, and doesn't come out until the

danger has passed. This tiny man knows that I am not completely mad, and it is he who is able to watch over the goats and return them to their owners at the right season (...). (De Bernières, 2004, p.718)

Following to other passage, he clarifies why he is mad and what makes his inner decaying:

There was a corporal who was mainly interested in rape and he took four of us from house to house and he would knock on the door, and when it was answered he would smile politely and say, "We mean no harm, we only want to fuck the women," and then we would have to kill the men who attempted to resist, and I would have to help strip the women and hold them down, and I would have to pretend to rape them when my turn came. I was no good at it, I couldn't manage it, but I had to pretend, and I would kneel down and lean forward before exposing myself, so that no one would see that I was having to pretend, and I don't even know if it made any difference to the women that I was pretending, because they cried and wailed just the same, whoever was on top of them. (De Bernières, 2004, p.722-23).

All these raping actions make İbrahim the Mad transgress. After these experiences İbrahim the Mad returns to his town but he is not same as before. He cannot survive these actions' burden. That is why he postpones his wedding with his beloved Philothei. Because she is a woman too and when he looks at her, he remembers the actions that he has made before even he has been unwilling too. As Foucault claims all these incidents cause other acts that İbrahim The Mad has done. In the end, these causes affect epidemically insofar as they reach for Philothei. İbrahim The Mad kills his beloved Philothei, even though, he does accidentally, his previous collected terrible experiences overflow and affect both of lovers. In this respect, Foucault's statement is proved right as man is determined by time and space.

On the other hand, Mehmetçik explains his process of becoming criminal when he is treated like a slave and he cannot accept this kind of humiliation:

They treated us not like men, but like slaves. We worked from dawn to dusk, without food or water, more often than not. If we were sick, or fainted, or rested they beat us and kicked us, or even whipped us. We became skeletons draped in rags. We were covered in sores and blisters, and the fleas and lice

tormented us. We slept in a sort of tunnel made of scraps of wood and cloth, all crammed together without a pallet and with nothing to cover ourselves, and all the time we were shitting ourselves with diarrhoea, and some people were even shitting blood, but we still had to work. (De Bernières, 2004, p.744)

Paradoxically, the more Mehmet tries to resist submission and stays proud as an identity, the more he takes the road to the moral transgression. When Karatavuk and Mehmetçik reunite, they are alienated from each other. They are just old friends right now. All the experiences that they pass through, the proximity to decay make them different from each other. In the war, the death experience make soldiers change deeply. Some of them like Karatavuk are able to cope with this experience, but others like Mehmetçik and Ibrahim the Mad experience inner struggle and cannot get over this experience, thus failing to become Dasein. As Foucault assumes, their decisions causes limitation. This limitation never let them to grasp the infinite meaning.

### 3.2 Witnessing Death of Others

In the war, Karatavuk disclose his inner self and establishes his Dasein slowly. According to Heidegger, the one who faces with death and death of others so many times, becomes indifferent to this experience and accepts it as a possibility of existence. In the narrative, Karatavuk narrates his shock when they have their first skirmish, seeing corpses all around and still trying to saving own self. After this experience, Karatavuk changes very radically that, all of them who survive from skirmish, begin to not mourn for dead ones, moreover, they feel happy for taking dead ones' clothes and boots. The circumstances do not let them mourn or have sentimental issues. All of the survived ones, like Karatavuk, adjust to the idea of death and dying. Now, this idea is not scary at all, the dead ones are just bodies for Karatavuk, having no soul or identity, they are just fleshes. As Nagel claims, this represents *expectation of nothingness*<sup>46</sup>. Karatavuk expects the nothingness after

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<sup>46</sup> There is also something that can be called the expectation of nothingness, and though the mind tends to veer away from it, it is an unmistakable experience, always startling, often frightening, and very different from the familiar recognition that your life will go on for only a limited time.

death and dead bodies. As Yalom assumes, ultimate nothingness comes with death. The meaning of life and death lose itself and their identities are lost. When someone dies, it is not a unique or special event for him anymore. He adjusts the idea of Foucault's being promised to an imminent death. Death comes any time and place. He expects the nothing that happens; it is just another flesh without any identity or soul:

If you are a soldier, you are forced to think about God more than those who are at home. All around you is death and devastation. You look at a disembowelled body, and you see that man consists of coils of slime inside, and yet he is smooth and beautiful on the outside. You look at a body and you see that it is not a man because the spirit has fled, and so the body does not fill you with grief. (De Bernières, 2004, p.493)

After this passage, Karatavuk again expresses his doubts about God, God's mercy and protection. Because they suffer a lot, but no one is here to save them and even they start to believe that it is their test. Karatavuk still questions and this search for truth makes him closer to Dasein.

Karatavuk moves forward to another level, which Heidegger explains it as no one can die instead of other; he only accompanies the dying one. Karatavuk does not die for his friend Fikret, but he accompanies him during his dying process:

Fikret turned his head very slowly, and his eyes had the look of a dead man, and he said, "Is your bayonet sharp?" and I said, "Yes, my friend, very sharp," and I thought he was going to ask me to kill him.

He gestured again with his left hand and pointed to his right arm, and said, "You'd better cut it off."

"Cut it off?" I repeated, feeling a sickness coming over me.

"It's no good. I want it cut off."

"I can't," I said.

"If you love me, cut it off. It offends me. If you honour me, cut it off."

(De Bernières, 2004, p.504)

In this part, Karatavuk understands that Fikret will die sooner and he helps him to cut his injured arm to stand a little longer until medical help comes. After he cuts his arm, Fikret's dying process begins. Even in this moment Fikret is very calm and looks at his arm which is cut few minutes ago. He and Karatavuk look at the arm as a piece of flesh and his indifference shocks the readers. He loses so much blood and still he is bleeding. Notwithstanding, he is not scared of dying; he and Karatavuk try to have peaceful last moments. He wants cigarettes and Karatavuk fetches him a few and they start to chat:

"We should get you to the field hospital," I said, and he blew out more smoke and replied, "No. This is it." He smoked some more, and said, "Why are you weeping, stupid son of a bitch?" and I didn't know till then that I was weeping.

I sat beside him as he smoked, first one cigarette, and then two, and by the third cigarette his head was beginning to fall and his eyes to close. I put my head close to his face, and he said, "This time I'm really fucked. I've got no blood left."

(De Bernières, 2004, p.506)

After Fikret confesses that he is dying, Karatavuk changes his attitude and tries to console and comfort him in his last moments with chatting about trivial things. During their chat, Fikret dies silently:

I wanted to say something light, so I said, "*Will you send me your spare virgins?*" and he smiled a very little and shook his head to say no, and then he sighed very deeply and died. I took his cigarette from between his fingers and finished it for him. I looked at him, and saw how beaten down he was. His uniform was patched with pieces of hessian taken from sandbags, and his boots were different sizes because they had been taken from different corpses. He looked like a beggar. For a long time I looked at the profile of his face, the Arab nose, the loose lower lip, and felt a coldness coming over me. I was shocked by how little I felt, by how quickly I got bored sitting next to his corpse and wanted to do something else.

(De Bernières, 2004, p.506)

Heidegger names this situation as *otherness*<sup>47</sup>. Dasein as Karatavuk, develops sudden indifference to his friend after he dies. Karatavuk detaches all his memories with Fikret and extracts his identity from his dead body. It is just same as other corpses which are everywhere in the battlefield. All of them lose their identities and become bodies without identities, souls. Fikret is another face drawn in the sand at the edge of the sea as Foucault describes.

Death of others affects Dasein by making him more authentic with questioning. Death exists but only a possibility of existence. Death of others forces Dasein to face with the self. Karatavuk faces with his own self. This confrontation makes Dasein more valuable and more developed. Death is experienced so many times by others. Heidegger claims that “*One dies*<sup>48</sup>”. This phenomenon makes the difference when Dasein faces with death. Everybody dies but not Dasein. According to Karatavuk, death makes the person lose the identity and become like everyone. He cannot accept being like everyone. That is the reason why he runs away and leaves the dead body which has no identity anymore. Yalom explains the situation that mortality of soul<sup>49</sup>, man is determined to die. This idea does not repel Dasein. The real disgusting thing for Dasein as Karatavuk is physicality of death<sup>50</sup>. It destroys the man but Dasein survives, thanks to philosophizing death.

After the war, Karatavuk remembers his action and it makes him surprised. However, his authentic mode forces him to be different from everyone. These experiences make him different from everyone. According to Karatavuk, death is an ending; end of identity. That is the reason why he does not bear to stand beside Fikret. He understands that only valuable are the ones who survive and live. Every death as finitude changes the meaning of death according to Foucault. In this respect, man is transferable only by speaking. After war, Karatavuk's comprehension of finitude of man alters, because, he accepts to speak about it. Every new

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<sup>47</sup> (...)Here the other manifests itself as *alter ego*. And this position is further radicalized by Heidegger in his portrayal of the other in terms of the being-with (*Mitsein*) of ontological selfexistence (*Dasein*). Otherness is a horizon of selfhood. (Kearney, R. (2005). p.16)

<sup>48</sup> Heidegger, M.(1926). p.234

<sup>49</sup>Yalom, I.D.(2008), P.33

<sup>50</sup>Yalom, I.D.(2008), P.79

comprehension of finitude creates a paradox about death of man. Its surface meaning and historical a priori change according to new comprehensions.

Heidegger reveals three stages for this facing with death and the effect of death of others. First stage is *unwholeness*.<sup>51</sup> Dasein always suffers from fragmentariness. Karatavuk does not know death and does not experience closely. The second stage is the one who does not reach to end, eventually reaches it. Karatavuk reaches death and experiences it closely. Last one is Dasein live in a mode in which he cannot let someone to accompany him. In his life after war, no one is able to comprehend his thoughts, situations and the self. After Fikret's death, Karatavuk enstranges from everything and experiences a symbolic death of himself. In another skirmish, he and his troop have been defeated terribly and their commander Mustafa Kemal orders them to fight till death until other troop comes and takes place in defence. Karatavuk explains his ideas as:

(...)This was the worst calamity I have ever been through, and after being so nearly swallowed by death, I live each day in a state of surprise and wonderment. I will never forget the pain that went through me when I began to thaw out, the tingling and throbbing of it, and I would say that this pain was as bad as being frozen in the first place. The one thing about the freeze that was God's insult to us was that when our clothing unfroze after three days, the lice that had been in there all came back to life as if they had never been frozen. The one good thing was that we were able to eat the mules and donkeys that had died, and the meat was good after so many months of olives and bread and bulghur wheat. (De Bernières (2004), p.515)

Even in this terrible situation, Karatavuk obtains a way to think hopeful and finds a way to exit from this frustration and desperation. He is a Dasein and survives all kind of terrible situations. He explains this situation as “...*this is what happens in war, which is that out of all the vileness, a small light still shines.*” (Bernieres, 2004, p.518)

In the war, Karatavuk is not the only one who questions everything. It is seen that enemies also question the meaning of the war and reach the same solution

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<sup>51</sup> Heidegger, M.(1926).p.237

like Karatavuk. This makes them close to each other. When ceasefire is declared, they begin to sum up their martyrs. During this process they talk to each other and comprehend that all of them are the same. They are the lambs who are sacrificed. All of them are manipulated by their religions and governments. All the hatred has gone by this process. When the enemies depart, they leave souvenirs to Karatavuk and his friends. Their departure make Karatavuk feel sorrowful. He remembers his friend Fikret who is killed by enemies, but Karatavuk justifies the situation by the fact he also kills enemies. These mutual features make them close and they commence to love each other. They live together and suffer together for a long time and their common target is killing each other to end the war and come back their homes.

### **3.2.1 The Other Representations of Death of Others**

Karatavuk is not the only one who witnesses death and dying process. Abdulhamit Hodja's wife Ayşe also experiences this loss. Abdulhamit Hodja falls ill after his beloved Nilifer is taken by army. He suffers a lot. His dying process is more sorrowful than Fikret's. Fikret is young and brave but Abdulhamit Hodja is old and his illness kills him deeply and slowly. Ayşe accompanies him in his slow dying process. She expresses her thoughts as:

In deference to such spectacular carnage it is perhaps perverse to dwell upon one person's death, but we are creatures so constituted that the passing of one friend or one acquaintance has a profounder effect than that of 100,000 strangers. If there is any metaphorical truth in the Jewish proverb that he who saves one life saves the whole world, then there is equal metaphorical truth in the proposition that when one person dies, the whole world dies with them.  
(De Bernières, 2004, p.543)

In this passage, it is reflected the difference between Dasein and ordinary person. Ayşe is the ordinary person who mourns after her beloved husband; she experiences agony with her loss. She feels the death as a great loss and abandonment. She expresses her agony with screaming on the street and her screams resound with



echoes all around the town. She loses her rationality and becomes irrational, sentimental woman. Everyone who hears her screams, feels the great sorrow:

(...)Out in the narrow street, clutching her head between her hands, she began to howl and wail, her clear and dolorous voice carrying over the rooftops and up the hillside, proclaiming her wretchedness and misery to the empty sky. Up among the ancient tombs, the Dog cocked his head and listened, understanding that there must have been a death. (De Bernières, 2004, p.550)

According to Yalom, grief, and sorrow are the main experiences that awaken the soul and mind. Firstly, Ayşe realizes her loneliness that causes a great shock. She does not know how to react or express her loneliness. It is a form of existential shock. After this shock, she perceives the reality, which is the loss of her beloved husband. These two experiences are so much for Ayşe to bear. She expresses this burden by screaming, crying and groaning with pain.

Pain of loss is the one of hardest experience that an ordinary person cannot endure and accept easily. Only Dasein endures and accepts pain of loss and death with strong self-control. It is a special gift that Dasein takes from his authentic mode and existential loneliness.

## **CHAPTER 4**

### **4. DEATH OF THE SELF**

It is the most striking chapter in the narrative. The character Georgio P. Theodorou narrates his process of dying and dying self. He is very calm and conscious when he is sunk in the sea and waiting for his death. He narrates his situation by a witty voice as:

You catch me at an awkward moment, my friends, and you may find my thoughts a little disconnected, but if you find me a little incoherent, if you detect that my discourse has come adrift, you will surely find me blameless, for I am at this very moment sinking slowly through the oily waters down to the harbour floor of this very lovely city that was Smyrna. I am, so to speak,

neck-deep in the proverbial excrement only in a most metaphorical sense, as I am in reality considerably over my head in brine. (De Bernières, 2004, p.647)

He tells his whole story retrospectively and excuses for his some unconsciousness and disconnected flows in his story. In the beginning of his sinking, he struggles and fights against sea but suddenly he comprehends his condition that he is dying and he makes a peace with this truth.

#### 4.1 Dying Process of the Self

According to Derrida, it is a moment that so close to death, the one *comes to consciousness*.<sup>52</sup> He obtains all his memories, thoughts and feelings in that moment. During these moments, G.P. Theodorou expresses his feelings and thoughts about death:

When you are not a strong swimmer, my friends, you are even less of a strong swimmer when fully dressed. This is a law of nature that no one can deny. I have been proving it empirically for the last hour or so. Sooner or later one has to give up the struggle, and the weight of one's sodden garments, combined with the extreme exhaustion brought about by panic and physical exertion, causes one to make peace with death at last, and then begins the long, slow descent to the murky realm of crabs and flatfish, seaweed, abandoned anchors encrusted with mussels and limpets, and inexplicable offcuts of thick rope and rusty hawser. (De Bernières, 2004, p.647-648)

He narrates his situation as a normal phenomenon. Yalom clarifies this situation as the one has *anxiety of death*<sup>53</sup>, but this anxiety does not mean the fear of death. This anxiety makes Dasein more authentic and close to face with the self. Death has a kind of mirror effect on Dasein, but this mirror reflects Dasein's own

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<sup>52</sup> (...) the soul only distinguishes itself, separates itself, and assembles within itself in the experience of this *melete tou thanatou*. It is nothing other than this concern for dying as a relation to self and an assembling of self. It only returns to itself, in both senses of -assembling itself and waking itself, becoming conscious [*s'veiller*], in the sense of consciousness of self in general, through this concern for death. (Derrida, (1992), p.14-15)

<sup>53</sup> Yalom, I.D, (2008), p.12

self. This is the greatest authentic experience that Dasein has. Death is a threshold which elevates Dasein to another level of authenticity. Facing with Death, first with anxiety and then acceptance of inexistence and the last stage is nonexistence. Inexistence is another mode that Dasein is between existence and ending. Ending is not same thing as death or dying. Dasein can end even though one lives biologically. If he stops or gives up authentic mode, it means his ending. Inexistence does not mean ending. It is another mode that Dasein must accept the death as possibility of life. It is a possibility. Everybody dies except Dasein; in Dasein's approach, everyone means no one and nothing to Dasein.

After anxiety of death, Dasein accepts the death as possibility and phenomenon of life. Life is unwhole without death. In this respect, for Heidegger, if Dasein has the experience of death, it means he reaches wholeness of his life and this wholeness means ending of Dasein.

In the novel, the narration of the character as Dasein represents all the stages of dying process by a frightening calmness. That means Dasein as G.P. Theodorou accepts the possibility and gets over the anxiety of death:

I can't convey to you the relief, the sheer pleasure, of abandoning the impossible struggle, the moment when one realises that it is less horrifying to die than to continue to struggle for life. It is nice, so very nice, to breathe the cold water deeply in and let it fill the lungs. One feels comfortable and clean, and a curious wavering solidity establishes itself in the head. I have just seen a large fish, and for the first time in my life have felt a pang of envy for the fishy lot. (De Bernières, 2004, p. 648)

He expresses his relief as acknowledging the death as normal phenomenon. This acknowledgement gives Dasein an opportunity to enlighten the reader by narrating process of dying. Firstly he depicts his environment as other dying ones as well:

Not far off I can see someone else sinking to the bottom, but her skirts have floated up around her face, and I wonder if she is concerned about dying in a state of immodesty, with her white camiknickers exposed for every drowning man to see. I would say that she has excellent legs, but I don't recognise them,

so they probably don't belong to any of my little favourites. (De Bernières, 2004, p.648)

Yalom considers this process as self-disclosure. The character pushes the limits of self-disclosure. This action makes intimate the relation between the character and readers. G.P. Theodorou discloses all the details of his dying process and his thoughts to create an intimate relation with readers to persuade them for accompanying him in his last moments. With this process, readers also experience existential shock by facing death very closely, even though its intimacy disturbs the readers. The character starts to depict the dying one's feelings when his body is gradually yielding to death:

All the canals of my nose have filled up, but my ears are hurting, and above me I can see the hull of a boat, and I have already become accustomed to the taste of salt. There are knocking noises reverberating through the water, and the sound of engines. They must be from the Allied warships that are watching with principled neutrality and cautious apathy as we struggle and drown. At first the water was stinging the burns on my face and hands, but now they are quite cool, I am pleased to say, and I can hardly feel the wound where the Turkish soldier shot me as I tried to swim away from the jetty. (De Bernières, 2004, p. 648-649)

It is very fascinating that he describes his environment, his bodily dying with a calm, rational, aware consciousness. Then he begins to express his thoughts about his past life, government's politics, his dreams and desires which are not fulfilled. It is his unwhole side which makes Dasein.

The depiction of his full awareness of the moment, with such a conscious description is a shocking experience to readers. Georgio P. Theodorou still tries to be careful about his language and kindness. This conscious plight might be understood as his desire to leave a mark, a memory behind him after he dies, he will be living in the readers' minds. This process does not kill him. His great wit and his authentic mode give him immortality. This Dasein does not reach ending.

## 4.2 Representation of the Self

According to Derrida, history always has a problem, as there is an eternal loop in the history and history repeats itself again and again. The cyclical nature of history also takes place in G.P. Theodorou's mind. His consciousness tries to manipulate readers' thoughts by his own thoughts about historical figures. He attempts to manipulate readers when he describes his identity and the self. He tries to construct the image of a harsh person in readers' eyes as like:

Let's get one thing clear; I am not and never have been a dumbbunny. If I were a dumbbunny, I would not have made my substantial fortune, would not have paid almost no taxes, and I would not have made good connections at every possible level of society. Nothing, my friends, is as innocent as the pursuit of cash, the avaricious but honest exchange of goods and labour. I am a capitalist, and no good capitalist can afford to be a dunderpate. I have made money out of every commodity, and even out of thin air, and I have spent it liberally on both necessities and frivolities. I have generated so much employment that when I get to Heaven God should give me a medal and my own private whorehouse. Without me many a fig grower would be poorer, and many a little tart less well dressed. (De Bernières, 2004, p.649-650)

The passage above leads another level of concept of death and dying. *“Stoics have attempted to teach people that learning to live well is learning to die well and that, conversely, learning to die well is learning to live well. Cicero said that “to philosophize is to prepare for death””*<sup>54</sup> According to this statement, the way people live affects the way they die. Concerning this theory, it means G.P. Theodorou have not lived morally or virtuously. This leads his death becomes vicious experience by being conscious in every minutes of his dying process. Even though, Stoics defends this theory, the novel's other characters disprove it. For instance, Abdulhamit Hodja, he experiences moral and virtuous life, but he dies in sorrow and excruciating pain. On the contrary, G.P. Theodorou does not feel any physical pain, even though he narrates the process of his suffocation. These two

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<sup>54</sup> Yalom, I.D., (2008), p.32

oppositions reflect the fact that life and death are interdependent but they do not have a certain clause. The novelist tries to depict this absurdity of life and death.

It is mentioned before that death is an existential shock and experience. It is significant point that perceiving the meaning of existential. Many of philosophers offer different meanings as: Kierkegaard considers Christian existentialism that means freedom and choice; Nietzsche approaches it as iconoclastic determinism; Heidegger concentrates on temporality and authenticity; Camus accepts it as sense of absurdity, and last but not least Sartre stresses on commitment in the face of absolute gratuitousness.<sup>55</sup> It is very obvious that existential is a subjective concept that changes its meaning and value for individual aspects. Death is same with existential in this concern, as it alters its meaning according to people who experience it.

In accordance with Heidegger, existence has two modes one is everyday mode, the other is authentic mode as it is mentioned before. Nonetheless, G.P. Theodorou projects these two modes in the one scene. In the beginning of his dying process, he is absorbed by his surroundings, this is how things are. The one only notices the things around him. Progressively, he starts to observe the miracle of “being” itself and appreciates the ontological or authentic mode that is things are, the way Dasein exists.

On the other hand, Schopenhauer’s triplet emerges by the way of G.P. Theodorou describes himself. Initially, he narrates what he has: material goods, job and wealth. After that, he tells what he represents in the eye of others, but these others are not only other characters, but also the readers. He cares about his reputation. Final and most significant one is what he is. The words when he describes himself are the best signifiers about his identity, his being. Being truly matters for a Dasein. His conscience is more valuable than his reputation. Inner equanimity emerges from acknowledging that it is not things that disturb us, but our interpretations of things.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>55</sup> Yalom, I.D,(2008), p.200

<sup>56</sup> Yalom,I.D,(2008), Ibid: 113

G.P. Theodorou attempts to depict his identity in readers' mind as clever, immoral, nonconformist. In this passage, it is very interesting that when someone is dying and has a possibility to describe his identity, he would probably exaggerate by presenting himself his identity as virtuous, noble or superior one. He would most likely create simulacra. However, G.P. Theodorou is different because he has to be. He is Dasein; he is not able to behave like ordinary people. He rejects this kind of simulation of great identity. He knows his own self. Dasein always comprehends and accepts his own self that is the most significant phenomenon of Dasein. That is the reason; he is honest to the self. He knows his own identity, own being and the self. Now, he is immortalizing the self with narrating all details of his being. His thoughts, memories and experiences are the most valuable parts which form Dasein's being. He expresses his ideas without hesitation; they are the most valuable parts of his being.

### **4.3 Dasein's Approach to History**

He projects all his features as a Dasein. He expresses all his ideas about various situations and discloses his difference from others. Firstly, he expresses his awareness of meaningless. He shows this experience with historical figures who strive for vain. Their cupidity for possessing everything in the world, agonizes innocent people. Therefore, he counts dumbs of the history without any rank as:

Here are some of the lackbrains in random order: the Greek people for electing to office a romantic, His Romantic Adventurerosness, Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos, who honestly thought he could annex the nicest half of Turkey and tack it on to Old Greece, even though no one had given him permission, even though most people here are Turks, and no one with any sense pisses off the Turks, because the one thing the Turks are very good at is overreacting when pissed off. Clodpoll number two, the Greek people again for being just as romantic as the aforementioned romantic, for thinking that just because the civilisation here used to be approximately Greek in the distant past and is now partially Greek, it should be forced into political union with Old Greece. Timbernounce number three, the aforementioned elected romantic,

Eleftherios Venizelos, Prime Minister of Greece, prodigiously overendowed with Big Ideas. ( De Bernières (2004), p.651)

In this paragraph, he criticizes all the historical figures of Greek society. He criticizes them as being self-centred, egotistic, being blind for reality. The way he criticizes them, the language he uses and words that he expresses are so aggressive and intimidating. Hatred and anger indicate his disturbed conscience. He is extremely aggressive because he witnesses only innocent ones have been hurt by these covetous historical figures. He is aware that it a game that played by those historical figures which is internecine. In the other paragraphs he criticizes religion, priests and hypocrisy of clergy. He reflects all his doubts about religion like Karatavuk does. His existential crisis leads interrogation of all the metanarratives one by one:

Talking of which, what about the positive plague of firebrand priests we've been inundated with? All these men of God who want us to go out and kill Turks in the name of Holy this and Holy that? What about all this talk of rebuilding Byzantium? What on earth for? And some of them even talking with all seriousness about the imminent return of the Marble Emperor! What are we supposed to make of it when Archbishop Chrysostomos himself puts on his mitre and blesses our troops when they land at the quay, and strikes at Turkish gendarmes with his pastoral staff, and encourages his entourage to spit on them?(De Bernières (2004), p.651)

Then he criticizes all the leaders and soldiers in the war. He claims that enemies hate each other because of the same thing. Again Derrida's paradox of problem emerges. Greeks attack Turks and try to destroy all the nation because they have done the same thing before and then Turks attacks Greek and try to do same thing. This is an eternal loop again, history always repeats itself and like Karatavuk, Theorodou criticizes the meaningless cycle of the history.

#### **4.4 Last Moment of Dasein**

In the inexistence mode, Theorodou discloses his identity and his thought about the life and the world around him. He bestows his most precious parts; memories and ideas. He gives some breaks and tries to prove that he is still conscious



about his body and his situation to readers. The last ones are his dreams, desires and his possibilities or in other words his regrets:

I wish I'd had the sense to scamper off to Eskibahçe. I could have had a little holiday in the Italian sector. I could have built a neoclassical archway to go with the pump house. I could have repaved the meydan. I could have paid for a clapquack to look after the girls in the cathouse. But it's all dreaming now. My sight is fading, but it's dark anyway. I didn't know there were crayfish here in the harbour. I prefer the Atlantic lobster, really. I have become unaware of my body. I am already too dead to be worried about dying. (De Bernières (2004), p.661)

These are the things he did not accomplish, he did not complete; his desires will never be reached by him anymore. However, it is not the ending for his thoughts. It is accepted that his purpose to narrate all his thoughts, dreams, memories and experiences is to challenge against act of forgetting as Kundera suggests: “*What terrifies most about death is not the loss of future but the loss of the past. In fact, the act of forgetting is a form of death always present within life*”<sup>57</sup>

As the time to embrace the death approaches, he uses his dying process very intelligently. Finally the last moment comes:

Georgio P. Theodorou, merchant and philanthropist, wishes you all a watery farewell. I would give you a wave but I don't know where my hand is, and more than likely you're not even there, whoever you are or aren't. Farewell Smyrna, farewell Rosa's, farewell my friends, farewell Lloyd George and Venizelos and all the other fuckwits, farewell my worldly goods, farewell even to myself. I just wish I didn't have to die with that stupid song about the fez going round and round in my head. (De Bernières, 2004, p.661)

As Yalom claims “*physicality of death destroys the one, but the idea of death saves the one.*”<sup>58</sup> That clarifies the situation of Theodorou's situation. He is dead physically but his thoughts, desires continue to exist. It is another level in which

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<sup>57</sup>P. Roth, *Shop Talk: A Writer and His Colleagues and Their Work*. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2001, p.97.

<sup>58</sup> Yalom, I.D, (2008), p.33

Theorodou still exists. It is apprehensible that he is saved from being forgotten. He still exists in the mind of readers.

Yalom also explains Theorodou's three stages of dying of the self by means of Epicurus' arguments as first one represents *mortality of soul*.<sup>59</sup> According to Yalom, if humankind is mortal and has no chance to survive from the death so humankind does not have anything to fear about. There is nothing to exist as like afterlife, consciousness and regret. It is same in Theorodou's situation. For him death functions as *awakening experience*<sup>60</sup>. This awakening gives him brilliant consciousness in the mode of inexistence but when he faces with death and crosses the threshold, he is in the boundaries of nonexistence.

In the second stage, there is *ultimate nothingness*<sup>61</sup> of death. In Yalom's consideration, death is nothing to humankind because the soul is mortal and this mortality is despised by death eventually. In Theorodou's situation, when he embraces death, he gives his farewell them and there is nothing; no word, no consciousness, no voice. In this case, Yalom calls death and sleeping as twins that he is inspired by Greek mythology (Thanatos and Hypnos are twins).<sup>62</sup> It is just an end. The author specifically makes the ending so abrupt in order to make readers comprehend that in this stage death and the self cannot coexist. One of them must bid farewell.

The last stage is Epicurus' argument of symmetry<sup>63</sup>. It is an ambiguity that, when the one is died, it means nonexistence. However, it is debatable whether nonexistence equals to the stage prior to the birth or after death. According to Heidegger, the nonexistence<sup>64</sup> after death is different, more special than the stage prior to birth because Dasein does not disappear after death. Dasein disappears when he complete his own self.

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<sup>59</sup> Ibid:79

<sup>60</sup> Ibid:31

<sup>61</sup> Ibid:80

<sup>62</sup> Ibid:12

<sup>63</sup> Ibid:81

<sup>64</sup> Heidegger, M. (1926). p.239

The last claim of Yalom is that *dying is the loneliest event of the life*<sup>65</sup>. Yalom explains that there are two kind of loneliness; one is every day and the other is authentic. Theodorou experiences the authentic one that he dies alone, but in fact he does not feel this loneliness, by reason of experiencing existential isolation. Because it a preference, preference of Dasein. Dasein is always alone. It is the uniqueness of Dasein, a kind of morbid solipsism. Experience of death cannot be shared with other. It is unique and priceless experience for Dasein.

G.P. Theodorou is the only character in the novel, who experiences transcendental finitude nad empirical finitude at the same scene. the other characters such as Fikret and Abdulhamit Hodja experience Foucault's emprical finitude. Abdulhamit Hodja experiences aging, illness as Fikret experiences illness by being injured in the war.

On the other hand G.P. Theodorou is different from them. He also experiences transcendental finitude by narrating his dying process. In this prespect, Foucault's theory is proved as G.P. Theodorou unveils himself as already there, as an living being, governed by empirical laws of life and speaking being using a language that preexists him.<sup>66</sup>He detaches himself from all empirical laws of life and unveils his being by using speaking and language.

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<sup>65</sup>Ibid:119

<sup>66</sup> B.Han-Pile, (n.d.). The“Death of Man”: Foucault and Anti-Humanism. *Foucault and Philosophy*,118-142. doi:10.1002/9781444320091.ch6. p.12

## CONCLUSION

Death of the self and the dying process are still most fascinating and ambiguous subjects for philosophy and literature. Death has influenced so many authors, philosophers from the beginning of the humankind. People still attempt to find an answer about the process and death itself.

The definition of the death has various attempts in different disciplines. All the definitions have changed according to time periods and contemporary circumstances. Thanks to well-developed technology, the definition has been varied vastly and it still alters from the perspectives of different disciplines. Nevertheless, the definition of death still exists with its complexity.

On the other hand, death and dying process have attracted great number of theoreticians and writers. This theoretical journey begins with Epicurus. Epicurus defends the idea that fear of death is unnecessary. Epicurus is followed by Hegel. Hegel asserts the idea of self-consciousness, self-identification and self-externalization which have great impact upon the De Bernières' characters especially in the process of dying. The next follower is Nietzsche. He develops the theory of Nihilism, death of God. According to Nietzsche, God does not exist, protect and is not a saviour. Nietzsche believes that only saviour and protector is the man's own self. The man becomes superior and perfect without help of others and God. He calls this man as superman or *übermensch*. This theory is to be seen in the narrative. Especially in the battlefield, soldiers like Karatavuk doubts about existence of God. The doubtfulness forces him to become Dasein, which is the great victory according to Heidegger. Heidegger develops theory of Dasein and he examines Dasein in stages like preparation, development and becoming. In this respect, Karatavuk especially reflects all the stages in the narrative.

He also examines Dasein in dying process and facing with death. In the narrative, Karatavuk becomes and develops as Dasein with experiencing death of others, otherness, closing to death, nothingness after death. Also, de Bernières reflects Heidegger's theory as death of the self through the character as G. P. Theorodou. It is a spectacular experience both for character and readers. Readers also

grasp the feeling of human condition during this dying process. It is kind of a simulation of dying process and death. Nonetheless, it is impressive to follow how de Bernières depicts the stage and a character that is very aware of everything around him. This stage externalizes Derrida's theory of come to consciousness. The one who is in dying process, comes to consciousness and remembers everything about his past life and aware of present situation. It is a different intelligence mode which mind works in high performance.

The memories, dreams, desires and thoughts are the most precious souvenirs that Dasein is able to leave at this authentic mode and existence. All the characters reflect the idea that after death, nothingness comes. When Ayşe loses her beloved husband Abdulhamit Hodja, when Karatavuk witnesses all corpses and his best friend's, Fikret's death and when Theorodou experiences his own self's death. All the situations support the idea that dead ones are nothing after death. They lose their identities, their selves.

As an end, de Bernières juxtaposes this idea of losing identity and being that are airbrushed from the history. All the dead ones live in their relatives' memories and mind. Memories are the perfect souvenirs of the man for eternity. It is very impressive the ways de Bernières creates all the binary oppositions even though the situations and concepts seem together in harmony. All the chapters are related with others; they are little systems gathered together and create a whole unity. De Bernières reveals unity in diversity. The narrative begins with harmony in Eskibahçe, in the middle continues with disharmony by war, famine, poverty and the end harmony returns but with some omissions.

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